

The Shudder-Image: Psyche-Soma, Sex and Knowledge in *Hannibal*

It begins with a tickle and ends in a blaze of petrol. That's always what *jouissance* is.

— Jacques Lacan¹

Screen//Mind/Body/Symptom

Bryan Fuller's *Hannibal* (NBC, 2013-2015) – an adaptation of Thomas Harris' Hannibal Lecter novels (and their filmic interpretations) – is one of the more formally experimental (and startlingly psychosexual) programmes to appear on US network television since the original two-season run of *Twin Peaks* (ABC, 1990-1991).² And while critics have aligned *Hannibal* with the contemporary era of 'Quality Television' – which has provided examples of visually ambitious and thematically challenging programming such as *Six Feet Under* (HBO, 2001-2005) or *Mindhunter* (Netflix, 2017-2019) – the majority of these series appear on premium cable or streaming services such as HBO, AMC and Netflix.³ *Hannibal*, by contrast, was commissioned by commercial broadcast network NBC: meaning it faced significant limitations in terms of budget and censorship in comparison to many of its Quality peers. Nonetheless, with the support of Gaumont International Television, Fuller was able to present a distinct vision of Harris' world as a three-season phantasmagoria of vividly designed and perversely executed violence, mutilation and horror – far beyond what viewers may have been accustomed to on *CSI: Crime Scene Investigation* (CBS, 2000-2015) or *Criminal Minds* (CBS, 2005-2020) – in which the conventions of the police procedural eventually give way to an elaborately staged queer romance between lead characters, FBI agent Will Graham and his psychotherapist Dr Hannibal Lecter.

One of the most striking features of *Hannibal*'s ornate mise-en-scène is the presentation of crime scene tableaux – mutilated bodies posed, often in the style of classical art – fashioned

by Lecter and his imitators. These baroque ready-mades suggest a horror lineage through similar set piece atrocities – from *Dexter* (Showtime, 2006-2013) and the *Saw* franchise to the prior cinematic adaptations of *The Silence of the Lambs* (Jonathan Demme, 1991) and *Hannibal* (Ridley Scott, 2001) – and have been the subject of recent critical discussion on the art of murder in the series.⁴ In this article, by contrast, I will focus on an as yet unanalysed audio-visual element of *Hannibal*: a pictorial quirk recurring throughout the series in the form of time-lapse photographed exterior shots placed between scenes of action. Ostensibly establishing shots, such cutaways produce through variations in light and air over time a *vibrato* movement within the frame – emphasised by Brian Reitzell's percussive, experimental score – which creates an effect that I will designate as the “shudder-image”. This term consciously evokes the taxonomy presented in the *Cinema* books – and Deleuze will provide a continual point of contact and contrast throughout my analysis – but, I will argue, this image requires a different sort of elaboration.

It is my contention that bringing to bear two key points of reference that *Hannibal* itself seems quite consciously to evoke – the art of Francis Bacon and the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis – will allow for a systematic conceptualisation of this unruly, unsystematic audio-visual effect as a particular form of embodied expression. In short, I will propose two interacting theses on the shudder-image in *Hannibal*, which will be developed through a detailed Lacanian discussion of the series in terms of its resonances with the existential violence and queer intimacies of Bacon's work. The first part of this article will consider the shudder-image as a kind of “conversion symptom”, speaking forms of unconscious knowledge within the series. The second will distinguish this shudder from potentially similar aesthetic concepts, indexing its self-reflexive movement to *Hannibal*'s Baconian horror. The third develops, like the series itself, towards a Baconian eroticism: finding a problematisation of sex on both canvas and screen which sets the stage for a further definition of this motif. The fourth

section will introduce the idea of the shudder-image as an “enjoying substance”, the carnal convulsions of screen form itself. The concluding part will differentiate this concept from Deleuze’s movement- and time-image typologies while identifying points of entanglement in the broader field of Screen Studies.

As such, this discussion of *Hannibal* situates itself in relation to contemporary debates in film-philosophy that are organised around psychic and/or somatic metaphors (while often explicitly rejecting a Freudo-Lacanian paradigm), and which, I claim, will nonetheless be unable to account for the specific impact of its aesthetic strategies. Conversely, as Alenka Zupančič observes in *Why Psychoanalysis?*, the mind-body relation is the proper object of psychoanalytic inquiry, meaning that it is uniquely situated to address both this broader question regarding the field of film-philosophy and the particular import of the shudder-image. Where, for example, Daniel Frampton’s *Filmosophy* or Vivian Sobchack’s *The Address of the Eye* consciously turn away from psychoanalysis, this article will aim to bring the unconscious – as understood through Slavoj Žižek’s reformulation of Lacan – back in to considerations of mind, body and screen, and eventually reconceive these relations in light of Zupančič’s groundbreaking, *What Is Sex?*. This will allow me to present a new model of *Lacanian film-philosophy* insisted upon by *Hannibal*.

My analysis thus also enters a terrain of critical literature on Fuller’s series that covers diverse topics such as authorship, adaptation, fandom, character and narrative.⁵ And while a number of works focus specifically on *Hannibal*’s audio-visual style, it seems that none has so far identified the motif I am calling the shudder-image. Nor, despite references to other art historical intertexts in *Hannibal* (Botticelli, Blake, Damien Hirst), does the literature appear to acknowledge the importance of Bacon’s paintings.⁶ Critics have also taken up the queer dynamics of *Hannibal*,⁷ and this article will build on many of those insights as well as elaborating a queer-Lacanian reading via Lee Edelman, whose radical theory has clear

resonances with the series. Finally, there are approaches to *Hannibal* drawing on philosophical perspectives – such as biopower or nihilism – and, most notably, Karen Felts' critique of 'the particular brand of Freudian psychoanalysis on which the detective/serial-killer genre relies' as it pertains to the series.⁸ However, I'd argue that, while Felts usefully highlights the playful allusions to the talking cure throughout the series, the vision of psychoanalysis presented here is a superficial caricature of "Freudianism" that reflects neither the complexities of psychoanalytic theory nor the film-philosophical potential of *Hannibal*.

Focusing on productive connections to psychoanalysis, queer theory and Francis Bacon, then, this article offers a new reading of *Hannibal*'s aesthetic strategies, drawing out the significance of a seemingly minor audio-visual motif in order to make it stand for the central preoccupations of the series overall. More broadly, my aim with this intervention is to contribute to the on-going negotiation between screen aesthetics and screen thinking by suggesting new possibilities for fruitful conversation among what thus far might have been seen as opposed schools of thought (film-philosophy and psychoanalysis), and by reorienting psychoanalytic commentary back towards close formal analysis as a primary mode of critical engagement. I will argue that attention to the aesthetics of *Hannibal* demonstrates the renewed relevance of a Lacanian perspective and suggests the need for a new paradigm of screen thinking based on the way in which psychoanalysis negotiates the relation between psyche and soma. Like the mind-body problem itself, this article will present two seemingly distinct but intersecting ideas regarding the significance of the shudder-image in *Hannibal* and will demonstrate how this motif and its interpretation insist upon a dialectic not of harmonious synthesis but one that emphasises productive rupture. Rather than a duality of opposites (as in two competing theses, a conflict between philosophy and psychoanalysis, the alterity of mind and body), we will find a complex inter-relation of all of these fields.

The Shudder-Image as Conversion Symptom

Hannibal focuses on criminal profiler, Will Graham, who is able to imaginatively identify with serial killers and, under the care of Hannibal Lecter, gradually falls ill over the course of the first season. In 'The Empath and the Psychopath', Jane Stadler examines this narrative trajectory through neuroscience and moral philosophy to elaborate a theory of embodied empathy, and suggests that Will's mental and physical deterioration indicates his 'deeply felt, corporeal value judgement' that such killers are 'morally abhorrent'.⁹ This is, however, to overlook Will's increasing openness to killing as he comes under Lecter's influence. Moreover, this argument – of evil manifesting itself on the body as a brain infection – presents a neurological inflection on the medieval notion of corporeal corruption by a sinful soul: that Will develops encephalitis *as a result* of the moral horror that he contemplates. I claim, by contrast, that the mind-body connection in *Hannibal* takes us elsewhere.

The *psyche-soma* question is of course at the crux of psychoanalysis: Freud's initial innovation was his insistence on the possibility of *psychogenic* illness, that an otherwise unexplained *physical* malady could have its source in a *psychical* conflict as an unconscious, embodied attempt by the patient to resolve a mental impasse.¹⁰ He described this conversion as a 'leap from a mental process to a somatic innervation',¹¹ and suggested a mechanism involving the *repression* of an unwanted idea to the unconscious while the associated libidinal energy was diverted, seeking discharge in a motor or sensory tic. It might, therefore, be tempting to understand the onset of Will's encephalitis as such a conversion symptom: his disturbed psyche 'join[ing] in the conversation', as Freud would put it,¹² by speaking through the meat of the brain. Will struggles to process both his capacity for violence and his growing bond with Lecter, and rather than an expression of the horror he has seen in others, then, Will's illness would be a result of the horror he sees *in himself*, of his own internal conflict (with encephalitis being a particularly heavy-handed metaphor for a "sick mind"). My point,

however, is not to *diagnose* Will as analysand; instead, my claim will be that the somatisation in *Hannibal* – which is to say, symptom-formation as a conversion into the body, a becoming-embodied of the conflict – occurs at a fundamentally *different* level from the one Stadler proposes.

To proceed, I will begin by noting that, in the 'philosophical turn' in Screen Studies over the last three decades,¹³ there has been increased emphasis on notions of both *body* and *mind* in conceptualisations of the technologies, experiences and forms of the moving image. This shift to a sort of methodological Cartesian dualism with the onset of film-philosophy as a critical field is best represented by two divergent tendencies (although sharing some specific sources): signified on one side by Steven Shaviro, Vivian Sobchack and Laura U. Marks, and on the other by Daniel Frampton and Patricia Pisters.¹⁴ Shaviro's polemically anti-psychoanalytic *The Cinematic Body* makes an argument – informed by Deleuze and Guattari – for understanding cinema in relation to the corporeal, suggesting that cinema abolishes the distance between the spectator's body and bodies on screen but also, further, that cinema abolishes differences between image and body. Shaviro claims that '[t]he cinematic apparatus is a new mode of embodiment' and effectively constitutes film itself as a body.¹⁵ Parallel to this, in *The Address of the Eye* Sobchack engages with Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology to suggest that cinema is an encounter between perceiving bodies (film and spectator): it 'is an act of seeing that makes itself seen, an act of hearing that makes itself heard, an act of physical and reflective movement that makes itself reflexively felt and understood'.¹⁶ Marks functions as a mediator between the two, combining Deleuze and phenomenology to theorise the 'skin of the film' as a site of contact and a 'haptic' mode of visuality emphasising the embodied experience of abstract visual textures.¹⁷ Conversely, Frampton's *Filmosophy* proposes a philosophical understanding of film – also drawing on Deleuze and Sobchack but in a different way – as a form of non-human *thinking*. He proposes

the neologism 'filmind' to conceptualise the specific expressive capacities of film as a mode of thought in images. Moreover, Frampton argues explicitly *against* Sobchack's phenomenological position, asserting the priority of *mind* over body in the film experience: '[i]n a sense the filmgoer's body dies, and the mind fully takes over'.¹⁸ Responding to Frampton, Pisters brings neurobiology to film-philosophy in order to theorise a 'neuro-image', which takes literally Deleuze's maxim *the brain is the screen* to conceive of contemporary cinema as a direct experience of 'the inner world of our brains'.¹⁹ Film-thinking and film-embodiment are thus two of the dominant modes of conceiving of film-philosophy today.

It is for this reason, then, that I claim the (re)introduction of Freud and Lacan is necessary. As Zupančič observes, the proper place of psychoanalysis is precisely at the interface of the psychic and somatic: its object 'is the zone where the two realms overlap'. However, this is not simply a question of 'two well-established entities ("body" and "mind")', but an intersection which is generative of both sides that overlap in it'. Psychoanalysis is, therefore, uniquely situated to address the field of film-philosophy, which broadly seems to map onto these "two realms" while simultaneously refusing, occluding or omitting psychoanalytic knowledge. Indeed, psychoanalysis and (film-)philosophy should not be considered mutually exclusive: as Zupančič notes, both Freud and Lacan developed their work in explicit dialogue with philosophy – e.g., Freud's recourse to Schopenhauer in 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' or Lacan's rethinking of transference through Plato's *Symposium* – and their ideas 'ha[ve] become massively involved in, and present on the stage of contemporary philosophical debates'.²⁰ With a focus on *Hannibal* – a series which itself openly invites psychoanalytic intervention – my aim here is to (re)involve psychoanalysis on the stage of philosophical debates on screen media. This does not constitute a simple return to the "Lacanian film theory" of the past, and I do not intend to relitigate those old debates

around what Hannibal himself refers to as 'the dead religion of psychoanalysis' ('Mizumono', season 2, episode 13).²¹ Rather, it is a turn to psychoanalytic thinking anew, in dialogue with the field of screen theorising to develop what could be considered a *Lacanian film-philosophy*, which remains sensitive to the exigencies of the text by bringing the specific insights of the unconscious to bear on its interpretation.²² What I propose in my reading of *Hannibal*, then, is not an either/or but a theory relating *both* "film-body" and "film-mind" together in a psychoanalytic negotiation that will eventually reconceive such dualisms and thus offer a novel mode of analysis.

It is in this context that I will introduce the notion of the *shudder-image*. As I have suggested, it takes the form of an audio-visual technique recurring throughout *Hannibal*: a particular kind of exterior establishing shot ostensibly serving to indicate a significant change of location in the story. The first example occurs in 'Apéritif' (season 1, episode 1), in a transition from an FBI office in Quantico, VA to the home of a missing woman, Elise Nichols. There is a straight cut from a medium close-up of Laurence Fishburne's Jack Crawford (Fig. 1) to a low-angle exterior shot of a house at night, with onscreen text designating the location as Duluth, MN (Fig. 2). The exterior shot, establishing the new location, lasts for approximately four seconds before another straight cut, again to Jack, now in the Nichols' family home in a slightly tighter close-up (Fig. 3). It is a fairly conventional sequence indicating a shift in time and place in order to progress the narrative. This might seem unremarkable and Fuller's script describes the middle shot, simply, thus:

EXT. NICHOLS' HOME - NIGHT

Establishing. A CHYRON tells us we are --

DULUTH, MINNESOTA²³

However, this omits two crucial factors: the time-lapse photographic effect and the sound design. The shot condenses several hours of night-time into its short duration, which is

discernible from the dramatic shift in size and direction of shadows cast by the house and by the busy celestial movements above its roof. This is accompanied by a juddering, shimmering synthesised tone on the soundtrack that reverberates over the cut and into the second shot of Jack. Rather than smoothing the transition as in a typical sound bridge, the effect of the noise and preternatural motion here is to set this brief shot *on edge*. There is a dissonant quality produced by the interjection of this *dis*-establishing shot within the sequence.





Figs. 1, 2 and 3. *Hannibal*'s first shudder-image ('Apéritif').

Moreover, fully to contextualise this sequence, we should also pay attention to the dialogue that precedes it. Jack has convinced Will to step out of the classroom and to consult for him on the Nichols case, which appears to be one in a string of related crimes. They discuss Will's difficulty in social situations and how the one-way transmission of a lecture

theatre best suits his temperament, but – compelled by photographs of missing women on Jack's map board – Will acquiesces, sighing: 'That may require me to be sociable' (season 1, episode 1). On the one hand, then, in the context of a somatisation – which is to say, a transfer of energy from mind to body – we could read this once again in relation to Will's subjective disposition as an anxiety regarding social interaction: in the shift from Virginia to Minnesota, the image *shudders with him* at the prospect of 'be[ing] sociable' (i.e. from *his* mind to the body of the image in a conventional, expressionistic manner). This would then be reaffirmed by the insistent, low-end pulse that throbs uneasily beneath the sequence.

On the other hand, we might start to read such a sound-image more *proleptically*: as suggesting that there is something *wrong* with the house itself. The shudder-image could then be considered a conversion symptom for the way in which it expresses an "unconscious" *knowledge* in audio-visual form: suggesting, for example, its knowledge that the house in fact contains Elise's corpse, returned to her bedroom by cannibal murderer Garret Jacob Hobbs who rejects her body because he discovers she has liver cancer, rendering the "meat" inedible to him. Like the mass in her abdomen, Elise becomes a body *out of place* within the belly of the house. The body of the sound-image could thus be interpreted as communicating this necessarily repressed knowledge through a juddering, symptomal disruption. As Žižek reminds us, the repressed returns 'from the future' in the form of the symptom, which is nothing but a senseless trace whose 'meaning is not discovered, excavated from the hidden depth of the past, but constructed retroactively – the analysis produc[ing] the truth' *in futuro*.²⁴ Thus, I could suggest that the truth of the shudder-image here is produced only by the subsequent revelation of Elise's body in an upstairs room: the establishing shot therefore *convulsing* in foreknowledge of the horror it will subsequently portray.

If this were an isolated instance, then my notion of the shudder-image would carry little interpretive weight; however, this technique becomes a recurring audio-visual motif

throughout *Hannibal*. The second example from the first episode seems to reaffirm the idea of a connection between the image-body and Will's state of mind: signalling not a change in location, as before, but a temporal shift from Will sitting amongst his dogs on the porch to sleeping in bed. The shudder-image this time is an exterior shot of his wooden house, again in time lapse, again presenting tremulous variations in light, shade and motion; the soundtrack is a low frequency murmur, again suggesting disquiet. In the subsequent sequence, Will sees Elise's body beside him in bed and he wakes with a start as she recedes into deep blackness. His mental terror here is thus retroactively reinvested into the body of the image (the preceding exterior shot). Understanding this technique as – for example – a *neuro-imaginary* of Will's *brain states*, however, would be too narrow because such a film-philosophical concept cannot account for the broader role of this aesthetic quirk in the series. My claim is that there is a more significant function played by the shudder-image in connecting the mind and body of *Hannibal* – which can be understood here as an audio-visual conversion symptom, rather than a form of film-thinking or film-embodiment as previously theorised – and this relates to Will's relationship with Hannibal and their bond with teenage survivor Abigail Hobbs.

This more significant appearance of the shudder-image begins in the second episode ('Amuse-Bouche') – once Will has met Abigail and killed her father – and occurrences multiply from this point onwards. We encounter a shudder-image in the scene following the title sequence: Will is lecturing on Garret Jacob Hobbs' 'copycat' as a photograph of the victim – Cassie Boyle – is projected behind him (Fig. 4). There is then a straight cut to a low angle exterior shot of the FBI building (Fig. 5) – another time-lapse image lasting approximately four seconds and accompanied by an undulating, gong-like synthetic drone – followed by a second straight cut to a following shot of Alana Bloom entering the hall (Fig. 6).²⁵ Although post-classical style might permit deferral (even omission) of an establishing

shot, the middle image of this sequence seems wholly redundant given that we already know where we are, we have not shifted location and the time elapsed between the shots of Will and Alana would be minimal. The shudder-image, I suggest, is now beginning to function more autonomously by evoking a certain mood for the narrative, or what Robert Sinnerbrink refers to as *Stimmung*: light undulating across the surface of the imposing, Brutalist building and the unsettling sound lend a sense of foreboding to this world. It resonates with Sinnerbrink's reference to Lotte Eisner and her description of *Stimmung* as ““psychical acoustics and the harmony of vibrations”; an atmosphere elicited principally by the expressionist play of light and shadow’.²⁶ Here, in foreknowledge of its own narrative path, the shudder-image proleptically indexes the horror of the *copycat* in this scene to the truth about Hannibal (i.e. *he* killed Cassie in order to teach Will something about the Hobbs case). Thus, we find an expressivity in the shudder-image that embodies the mood of *Hannibal* as a whole. While human architecture in these images remains rigid and motionless, it is sun, wind and vegetation which pulse uneasily in the shudder: as if nature itself recoils Gothically in the face of such crimes.





Figs. 4, 5 and 6. The shudder-image between Will and Alana, 'Amuse-Bouche'.

This effect reoccurs five times in the next episode ('Potage'). It begins with a time-lapse shot of a forest (Fig. 7), trees shaking awkwardly in the wind (matched by a pulsating, metallic tone on the soundtrack), which cuts to Abigail and her father stalking a deer; this pre-title flashback concludes as the butchered deer transforms into a dead girl and Abigail regains consciousness in the present. Following the title sequence, Alana visits Will to tell him that Abigail has awoken; they discuss her case and the lingering suspicion that she was her father's accomplice. Will insists on Abigail's innocence and Alana offers to visit her, then there is a straight cut to a daytime exterior of a house (Fig. 8): another time-lapse, shuddering image, this time of Abigail's residential psychiatric facility. After her visit, Alana meets with Jack and Hannibal, her journey signalled by yet another shudder-image of the exterior of the BAU headquarters (Fig. 9). They converse and Jack reiterates his belief that Abigail is implicated in her father's crimes: *these* shudder-images thus seem to be haunted by the question of Abigail's guilt and again anticipate the revelation of her complicity in murder. The fourth instance ties this strand back to the narrative of the second episode: lecturing

again, Will discusses the connection between the copycat and Garret Jacob Hobbs. Hannibal (who *is* the copycat) stands at the back of the hall and, as Will concludes, there is a cut to a close-up of Hannibal's faint smile of recognition. This shot is followed by a shudder-image of Abigail's facility at dusk, shown from a different angle, and indicating Will and Hannibal's journey to visit her (Fig. 10). The final example in this episode occurs when the pair take Abigail back to her family home in an attempt to work through her trauma, and appears between a moment in which Hannibal takes control of Abigail and Will suffers a fever dream in which he pictures a feathered stag and sees himself slitting Abigail's throat: this time the image being an exterior of Will's hotel (Fig. 11).







Figs. 7-11. The five shudder-images of 'Potage'.

This accumulation of shudder-images and the convergence of the 'copycat' and 'Abigail' narratives is significant. In both instances *Hannibal* knows something that must be denied: Abigail was indeed her father's accomplice and not only is Lecter responsible for the copycat killings but he's also surreptitiously working to influence both Will and Abigail to embrace their murderous impulses. Will refuses to believe that she's guilty and also seems blind to Lecter's menace, but a sense of his own unconscious awareness *is* indicated by the overt symbolism of the feathered stag figure haunting his dreams: a symptomal condensation implicating both Lecter (who owns a similar statue) and Hobbs ('the Minnesota Shrike') in Graham's psyche. *Hannibal* similarly denies us direct access while unconsciously affirming such knowledge through its formal organisation: one should at least *suspect* Lecter – particularly after he's shown preparing suspiciously human-looking viscera in 'Amuse Bouche' – but neither his guilt nor Abigail's is explicitly confirmed until 'Relèves' (season 1, episode 12). Such knowledge, the *idea* of their crimes, then, cannot be expressed *directly* at this earlier point in the series (i.e., through exposition) for the sake of maintaining narrative

intrigue; however, it seems that the weight of it, the *libidinal charge* of the idea of their guilt cannot be repressed. This might evoke what Kierkegaard described, in terms of a moment of inspiration, as the 'shudder of an idea' emerging into consciousness. However, *this* shudder is an idea that never fully "arrives" in conscious thought; instead, it is diverted into a disturbance of the flesh.²⁷ As Freud puts it, '[t]he affect that is torn from [the repressed idea is] used for a somatic innervation. (That is, the excitation is "converted")': here into the bodily expression of *Hannibal's* shudder-image.²⁸ Moreover, while Abigail does admit her guilt to Will, he is absent from the mutual revelation between Abigail and Hannibal in 'Relèves' thus severing the sense of a direct link between Will's knowledge and the mind of *Hannibal* (which is to say that the series is not restricted solely to his perspective and neither therefore is the shudder-image).

Rather than presenting such (character-level) psychologisation – as per Pisters' neuro-expressionism, for example – *Hannibal* could be said to have communicated its *own* unconscious knowledge directly – in a certain sense, *hysterically* – through the libidinal charge of the sound-image. As Žižek observes,

Is what we encounter in hysteria not precisely a 'body of truth': in the bodily symptoms that result from the hysterical 'conversion', the immediate organic body is invaded, kidnapped, by a Truth, transformed into a bearer of truth, into a space/surface onto which the Truths (of the unconscious) are inscribed – hysteria is the ultimate case of Lacan's *c'est moi, la vérité, qui parle* (...) the body is canceled or suspended as indifferent in its immediate reality, it is taken over as the medium of Truth.²⁹

The shudder-image could thus be considered the truth of *Hannibal* speaking through its audio-visual body. The murderous reality of Hannibal, Abigail and Will is hysterically converted from the story's unconscious: an impulse pushes its way through and produces symptomatic images. The programme is invaded by these incongruous exterior shots, the

narrative suspended as it is taken over by the sudden, brief intervention of the shudder-image. Such is the magnitude of the horror of their crimes that it overflows its psychic bounds and emanates out from the body of the image at the points I have identified.

Where, for Freud's analysands, an unacceptable thought was made into a somatic disturbance, in *Hannibal* it is converted into sound-image in a manner not yet accounted for in film-philosophy. For example, Frampton's notion of film-thinking – even as a theorisation of film style and the expressivity of form – would be insufficient here because it refuses the unconscious and reduces film to *res cogitans* at the expense of *res extensa* (while psychoanalysis insists upon their necessary co-implication). Frampton claims that – in the darkness of the cinema – the body recedes and the mind takes over, while the filmind has no body at all. The shudder-image is not simply how *Hannibal* thinks Abigail's implication in her father's crimes or Hannibal's own imbrication in this pathology because it is not a thought that is available to the consciousness of the sound-image until long after the fact: it is, instead, the aesthetic form of its ignorance on the matter. Frampton rejects any sense of the role of the unconscious in his film-thinking; however, the thought of Abigail's guilt resides firmly on *ein anderer Schauplatz*, not brought over to the consciousness of *Hannibal*'s audio-vision until episode twelve. It finds expression in sound and image as a *conversion* of this unconscious knowledge into bodily motion: from the mind of *Hannibal* season one as such, to the body of its early episodes as a recurring audio-visual tic. The shudder-image here is not the film thinking a thought in its filmind but registering an unconscious idea in its image-body. Frampton's reduction of film-thinking to film-consciousness cannot account for the particular effect of the shudder-image as an expression of traumatically repressed truth, the artefact of which is found in these vibrato time-lapse cutaways: the libidinal charge finding another means of expression through its transformation into image form.

This might put my theorisation in closer proximity to phenomenological approaches to the screen/body; however, Sobchack's thinking similarly allows no place for the unconscious – being predicated on an explicit rejection of the psychoanalytic paradigm – which, she insists, itself has no place for the body.³⁰ The concept of an audio-visual “conversion symptom” of unconscious truth returns us, conversely, to the very *origins* of psychoanalytic thought in the phenomenon of *corporeal disturbance*. Moreover, there might be a danger in such approaches of overly anthropomorphising screen media as per Jennifer Barker's identification of the film body's skin, musculature and viscera with those of the spectator in *The Tactile Eye*.³¹ Once again, this is where the specificity of psychoanalysis becomes important: it is precisely those things generally occluded from contemporary approaches to screen analysis (unconscious; *jouissance* – as will be explained in the next section) that mark an anti-human agency within the human subject and thus point to the philosophical specificity of Lacanian theory.³² By insisting upon on the role of this inhuman-within-the-human and aligning it with screen aesthetics in particular, *Hannibal*'s shudder-image thus begins to suggest new ways of conceiving of film-thinking and film-embodiment.

Equally, we might connect the mind-body-screen formation here to the *fabula-syuzhet* relation – with film-mind corresponding roughly to story and film-body to plot – and Bordwell's theory of narration *does* allow for the *withholding* of story information in the unfolding of the plot. However, the means of the transfer or conversion from one to the other that I delineate here would not be permissible, even conceivable, within this framework. Bordwell's neoformalism cleaves to a cognitivist paradigm that does not emphasise embodiment (even where a neuroscientist such as Damasio and neuro-film theorists such as Guerra and Gallese *would* do so) while also ostentatiously refusing psychoanalysis.³³ As such, Bordwell's model would not allow for a conception of this effect in relation to the *unconscious*, either. Such an irrational formal element would fall outside of the ‘schemata’:

there is no clearly identifiable 'type', nothing 'canonic' or 'appropriate' in the shudder-image, nor even a sense of parametric 'order'.³⁴ Indeed, Rick Altman argues that the Bordwellian approach does not sufficiently account for *excess* in film style. Rather than a simple aberration from an established norm, excess for Altman 'alert[s] us to the existence of a competing logic, a second voice' within the work.³⁵ This already begins to sound like the agency of the unconscious within the sound-image; however, where Altman finds specific *systems* of excess in modes such as melodrama and musical, the stylistic excess of *Hannibal* here constitutes a far a more unruly, unsystematic audio-visual effect.

The shudder-image does not appear to conform to an easily or neatly categorisable function. As I have noted, the published scripts of *Hannibal*'s early episodes do not explicitly mark these transitions but they *do* begin to list 'TIME-LAPSE' establishing shots from 'Potage' onwards. However, these do not systematically mark "act" breaks in the narrative, nor do they correspond to the actual appearances of the shudder-image: the teleplays offer a total of twenty-one examples compared to the forty instances in the final cut of Season One. There is, therefore, a total mismatch between source text and image when these audio-visual convulsions occur.³⁶ Furthermore, in the context of network television aesthetics, the shudder-image does not appear to mark or book-end an ad break: the contiguity of the sound design – which is to say, the fact that the score/sound effects generally bridge the cuts both in and out of the shudder-image seamlessly – suggests that these are integral sequences in the flow of the action.

Moreover, in comparison even with other, tonally similar TV series the function of the shudder-image appears distinct. For instance, if we were to consider *Hannibal* as completing a "Weird FBI" trilogy with forebears *Twin Peaks* and *The X Files* (Fox, 1993-2002) – series which each use prominent cutaway/establishing shots – we would reveal only their key differences. Firstly, Lynch and Frost's series uses a repeated shot of Snoqualmie

Falls, which might evoke the cutaway landscapes of *Hannibal*, but this is typically used, in combination with a diagonal tilt-pan to the Great Northern Hotel, as a standard establishing shot. Elsewhere, unmotivated cutaways of lonely traffic lights or the breathing firs *do* add a certain oneiric *Stimmung* to the scenes but lack the aesthetic excesses of time-lapse and discordant score that define *Hannibal*'s shudder-image. Secondly, *The X Files* developed a motif of establishing-shot-with-chyron to identify its diverse locations, and the serif font and all-caps text chimes with the same technique in *some* of the shudder-images; however, the *X Files* shots otherwise align much more closely with those limited instances of conventional establishing shots that occur in *Hannibal* (such as the FBI Academy in 'Apéritif'). Closer might be the final frames of the opening credits, which bear Chris Carter's famous slogan 'THE TRUTH IS OUT THERE'. Behind the onscreen text is a brief shot of a crepuscular time-lapse sky punctuated by a fork of lightning. Although visually similar to the shudder-image, this moment is safely contained within the titles (rather than interrupting the narrative throughout) and in being repeated exactly at the start of every episode becomes more of a rote gesture than an unsettling interjection. Lastly, a tonally different series such as *Breaking Bad* (AMC, 2008-2013) – Vince Gilligan's work on *The X Files* notwithstanding – *does* deploy time-lapse interludes of the New Mexico landscape across its five seasons. However, these are generally used to mark the passage of narrative time and are aesthetically far gentler than *Hannibal*'s shudder-image, taking on an almost Malickian quality with the slow procession of golden sunlight and billowing cumulus contrasting markedly with the claustrophobic convulsions of *Hannibal*'s East Coast vistas.

Finally, given the overt *Japonisme* elsewhere in the series – with episodes of the second season named after the courses of a traditional *kaiseki* dinner – the interludes in *Hannibal* might be seen to gesture towards Ozu's so-called 'pillow shot', which – Noël Burch suggests – acts as a sort of visual non sequitur between scenes, setting a mood for what

follows.³⁷ The shudder-image, however, differs in crucial ways. It is – as we have already seen – ostensibly more like an establishing shot than Ozu's cutaways, which Burch argues present a pictorial space or plane of reality apart from the diegesis (while elsewhere Bordwell attempts to recoup them as examples of parametric patterns and matches, and Deleuze as a *time-image* representing duration and change).³⁸ The shudder-images *are* tied more directly to the storyworld while nonetheless contrasting, as I've noted, with the use of conventional exterior establishing shots elsewhere in *Hannibal*. Those cutaways lack the stylised sound design and time-lapse effect and thus serve to emphasise, by contrast, the special status of these other, stranger insertions that hold continuity and discontinuity in tension. The shudder-image also lacks the defining *stillness* of the pillow shot and, therefore, doesn't *cushion* the transition so much as *discomfit* it. It is that which sticks out, interrupts the smooth operation of the text, and defies all but its own categorisation. Conceptualised in terms of an audio-visual innervation as delineated above, my theory of the shudder-image presents a Freudian-Lacanian rendering of the way in which a kind of unconscious story knowledge finds its expression in the body of the sound-image itself. The shudder-image as conversion symptom is thus in excess of film-philosophy, post-theory and conventional media analysis, addressing rejections and lacunae in all such screen thinking.³⁹

The Shudder of the Image

If this motif in *Hannibal* does not, therefore, conform to existing modes of screen aesthetics, then what is the specific nature of its shudder? How might it relate to broader traditions in art and philosophy? Answering *these* questions will allow us to establish the full importance of close attention to *Hannibal* as this article moves towards its second thesis. I designate the effect as the shudder-image because it is as if the diegesis quakes at the prospect of what will occur. This might evoke what Mark Fisher refers to as 'the shudder of the eerie' in relation to

the landscapes of fantasy fiction. However, the shudder of the shudder-image would be closer to Fisher's category of the *weird*, and specifically what he calls the '*weird psychoanalysis*' of Lacan, the death drive and jouissance:⁴⁰ categories which will be vital to the second part of my analysis. Before this, however, comes Adorno's description of the shudder in an encounter with the work of art, where he defines 'aesthetic comportment (...) as the capacity to shudder' and aligns this even with the essence of subjectivity itself: 'life in the subject is nothing but what shudders'.⁴¹ It is the experience of being touched by otherness, a Kantian sublime or Benjamin's shock of modernity.



Fig. 12. *Reminiscent of a Picasso portrait?* ('Buffet Froid').

In light of Adorno, then, we can certainly appreciate how *Hannibal* puts us into contact with forms of radical art. On the one hand, in '*Hannibal: A Disturbing Feast for the Senses*', Angela Ndalanis is correct to discern the obvious influence of Damien Hirst's vitrines on the fate of BAU crime scene investigator Beverly Katz. On the other, Ndalanis further suggests that, in 'Buffet Froid', the distortion of Hannibal's face in shots from the

point of view of a victim with a neurological-visual disorder (Fig. 12) transforms his face 'into a distorted vision that is reminiscent of a Picasso portrait'.⁴² However, this connection is much less certain. Hannibal's features are indeed rendered indistinct but this does not disturb the fundamental topology of his face – what Guatarri identifies as the 'facializing eye-nose-forehead triangle' – in a manner congruent with Picasso's cubist abstractions.⁴³ Moreover, there is, in art historical terms, a missing link between Hirst and Picasso in the work of *Francis Bacon*, which clearly has a strong bearing on the overall formal organisation of the Lecterverse (and given Ndalianis' discussion of the artistry of visceral horror in *Hannibal*, it is striking that Bacon does not feature in the analysis). Indeed, the painter's influence on *The Silence of the Lambs* was explicitly avowed by Production Designer, Kristi Zea, who cited Bacon's compositions as a reference point for the film's infamous crucifixion-cage tableau (Fig. 13).⁴⁴ Similarly, the violent textures of Bacon's works – such as *Crucifixion* (1933) and *Painting* (1946) (Figs. 14 and 15) – are felt throughout *Hannibal*: most notably in the direct evocation of both Bacon and Demme in the cruciform "angels" of 'Coquiles' (season 1, episode 5) (Fig. 16).



Fig. 13. The crucifixion-cage, *The Silence of the Lambs*.



Figs. 14 and 15. Francis Bacon's *Crucifixion* (1933) and *Painting* (1946).



Fig. 16. A crucified "angel", 'Coquilles'.

Through his art, Bacon famously aimed 'to unlock the valves of feeling and therefore return the onlooker to life more violently',⁴⁵ and attention to Bacon's aesthetics here will prove invaluable in unlocking the significance of the shudder-image in *Hannibal* and for film-philosophy more broadly. In such images above it is clear that Lecter's diegesis is overtly inspired by Bacon and may well have a similarly violent effect on the viewer. Such a shock might approach the kind of shudder Adorno describes as the impact of the radical work of art. More specifically, it might be tempting to connect this effect to what Deleuze, in his own study of Bacon, refers to as 'the violence of a sensation (and not of a representation)'. This pertains more to a question of form than of content and entails an exchange of narrative – 'the violence of the depicted scene' – for a 'violence that is involved only with colour and line': Bacon's paint assaulting the viewer on a sensory level.⁴⁶ Similarly, Parveen Adams, drawing on Bacon's own reflections, suggests his work 'rejects illustration and narration and seeks to replace them with what he calls "matters of fact"'. These turns out to be nothing less than sensations that act directly on the nervous system'.⁴⁷ However, the shudder-image, I claim, resonates with Bacon in a different way: it is not *we* who shudder before the work of art but *the work of art itself* that shudders in tacit acknowledgement of its own horrors.⁴⁸ The shudder-image in *Hannibal*, then, interrupts the narration with matters of (unconscious) fact that act directly on the "nervous system" of its own screen-body. It is not the *onlooker's* valves of feeling that are unlocked in this instance but those of the image itself. This might take us closer to what Deleuze, elsewhere in his study, describes as the 'spasm': the effect of movement on an immobile body, the exertion of a body attempting to escape itself that is 'Bacon's approximation of horror or abjection'. It is a disruption, a deformation due to a 'more profound cause', or what Deleuze describes as 'the action of invisible forces on the body'.⁴⁹ However, the *invisible force* in *Hannibal* is the *more profound cause* of Truth that Žižek identifies at the site where the unconscious speaks with a murmuring of violence. The

conversion of such Truth into image thus marks a similar horror in the unconventional formal organisation of *Hannibal* as we find in the work of Bacon: and it is this connection between paint and screen that will allow us to rethink the connection between mind and body with this article's second thesis.

Queer/Horror/Television

Bacon's expressive compositions were also a vehicle for intense homoerotic desires: a feature that will again be vital in unlocking *Hannibal*'s shudder-image. Bacon frequently depicted his lovers – Peter Lacy, George Dyer – as subjects of his work, their tempestuous affairs spilling onto the canvas. He was, as Gregory Salter observes,⁵⁰ a painter of queer intimacy as well as existential violence, the two often being intimately bound in his work: as in the wretched scene of Dyer's suicide in a Paris bathroom – hunched over a basin, slumped dead on a toilet – in *Triptych May-June* (1973). Bacon was also an admirer of Eadward Muybridge's chronophotographic studies of the human body.⁵¹ However, where Muybridge offered a more impassive gaze, breaking down the biomechanics of motion into discrete, objective units, Bacon reimagined the scene, infusing it with profound eroticism. This can be seen most directly in *Two Figures* (1953, Fig. 17), which is modelled after Muybridge's plates of men wrestling in *The Human Figure in Motion*. The uppermost figure straddles the one below, clutching him from behind, their faces pressed together, bodies melding in a clinch on a dishevelled bed. Here the prehistory of cinema becomes a scene of gay sex at a time when homosexuality remained illegal in England. As Michael Peppiatt relates: 'Erica Braunsstein, herself no prude, found the [painting] so evocative that she felt compelled to hang it out of the way, in an upstairs corner of her gallery, for fear of the scandal it might cause'.⁵² The visceral power of sex destabilises the image – the lovers' faces are rent by vertical lines of libidinal force – and scandalised London society by its depiction.



Fig. 17. *Two Figures* (Francis Bacon, 1953).

As Freud observes in his 'Three Essays on Sexuality', then, sex is a *problem*: one that similarly persists in *Hannibal* where it is figured largely as absent, blocked or compromised. A case in point being the moment when Will begins an FBI lecture on sexualised biting early in season one and Jack suddenly arrives to dismiss the class: thus setting the tone for the (non-)presentation of sex throughout the series. Will himself is initially characterised as almost asexual: he can assume the mindset of another subject but is unable to form meaningful bonds with others. For example, he flirts with Alana but withdraws once her affections start to bloom. Conversely, in 'Futamono' (season 2, episode 6), Hannibal seduces her in order to cultivate an alibi and get closer to Will's own desires in an example of their profound cross-identification. Such events are evoked through a classically chaste visual

logic relying on *absence* and *inference*. Hannibal and Alana's sex, for example, is implied by three standard images: close-ups of the couple kissing; a straight cut to an extreme long shot of the pair perched on Hannibal's piano stool, Alana with her back to the camera; another straight cut to the sleeping couple, *déshabillé* in bed, the camera revealing first Alana and then Hannibal in a slight pull back. From the temporal ellipsis and shifts in location and costume, we are given to understand what has taken place between them: sex figures here only in its non-figuration.

The introduction of the Vergers late in season two marks a more direct injection of sex into proceedings. At Hannibal's tacit urging, Margot Verger seduces Will in an attempt to produce a male heir. Their tryst is intercut with a further coupling of Hannibal and Alana: the implication being – Fuller suggests – that Will is imagining Alana while engaging Margot.⁵³ This more elaborate rendering of sex – at least in contrast with what has (not) occurred so far in *Hannibal* – presents an instance of what Žižek calls the fantasmatic support of sexuality. Rather than emphasising the fact that we are always thinking about “it” whenever we are doing something else (Freud's supposed pansexualism), the Lacanian perspective on sex insists that when really are *doing it*, we must be thinking of something/someone else:⁵⁴ to remove this fantasmatic dimension would be to drain it of pleasure, a catastrophic desublimation reducing the activity to so much undignified humping. While not being pornographically explicit, the depiction of sex in *Hannibal* here is closer to the “real thing” in this shift to fantasy. Never directly realisable, sex must always be approached at one remove, through the support of the imaginary.

A thoroughgoing examination of US media censorship would be beyond the scope of my analysis; however, it clearly bears on the representation of sex in *Hannibal*. Critics do not always recognise the importance here of the Federal Communication Commission's Obscenity, Indecency and Profanity regulations: for instance, both Rebecca Feasey and Helen

Wheatley move unproblematically between productions on ABC and HBO in their separate discussions of the pornification of media, and do not acknowledge qualitative differences between sexual content in, for example, *Desperate Housewives* (ABC, 2004-2012) and *True Blood* (HBO, 2008-2014).⁵⁵ While *Hannibal* might be closer to the latter in its portrayal of violence and gore, this NBC programme remains much closer to other network fare in its portrayal of sex than those premium cable productions not subject to the FCC. Otherwise said, sex is thoroughly problematised here: as in the scandalous public encounter with intense homoeroticism in Bacon's paintings, it constitutes an impasse or something unassimilable. *Hannibal* thus suggests what I'm tempted to call a *productive misinterpretation* of Lacan's declaration: *il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel* ("there is no sexual relation", which might be rephrased here as: *there is no rapport with the sexual*).⁵⁶ This is not to say that people *don't have sex*, which – as *Hannibal* has already demonstrated – is manifestly untrue. Nor is it any sort of *Men-are-from-Mars/Women-are-from-Venus* theory of the conflict between binary "sexes". Instead, this is what Zupančič calls an *ontological* claim for sex as that which is usually excluded from philosophy, which does not "fit in" to the account of Being. This aligns sex with the Lacanian Real: the point at which its own impossibility (i.e., full satisfaction) – and, indeed, impossibility as such (i.e., sex as the stumbling block of our discourse) – is registered in reality (and which begins to establish the ground of my second thesis on the shudder-image).⁵⁷

Nowhere is this clearer, I suggest, than in the treatment of Hannibal and Will's relationship. While *Hannibal* has been enthusiastically taken up by online communities celebrating the conjoining love of 'Hannigram' and is discussed in critical commentary as a queer text, the nature of their bond remains slippery and contestable.⁵⁸ Following D. A. Miller's well-known analysis of *Rope* (Alfred Hitchcock, 1948), I'd suggest that moments such as Hannibal's first furtive *sniff* of Will in 'Coquilles' or their wistful reunion twenty four

episodes later in the Uffizi Gallery offer a degree of 'semiotic insufficiency', meaning that Hannibal and Will's queer sexuality remains largely 'consigned to connotation'.⁵⁹ In short, it remains unclear what such an event explicitly signifies: they might be old lovers reunited in Florence or they might be murderous rivals, analyst and analysand passively aggressive in a public confrontation. In part, this is – Fuller suggests – because the characters' queer dynamic emerged as an organic development of growing intimacy between the actors (Hugh Dancy and Mads Mikkelsen).⁶⁰ Equally, however, this attests to the special status of gay male sex as opposed to heterosexual and lesbian sex, which both find fuller expression in *Hannibal*. As Raley and Lucas note, the Code of Practices for Television Broadcasters prohibited depictions of homosexuality until 1983; and the FCC's current vague definitions of indecency 'may cause some network producers to shy away from LGBT content'.⁶¹ While Alana's relationships with both Margo and Hannibal arguably remain keyed to a heterosexual masculine visual pleasure, the overt homoeroticism of Hannibal and Will is beyond the pale for NBC.⁶² On screen, the latter retains an air of plausible deniability regarding its libidinal investments, holding in suspension the question with which Hannibal tacitly confronts us:

Will he eat me or fuck me?

The queer-horror conjunction here – which will be definitive equally of *Hannibal* and the shudder-image – preserves this instability. As Sean Donovan observes, Hannibal's cannibalism complicates the image of Hannibal smelling Will: blurring 'boundaries between carnal and carnivorous desire'. The result, Donovan argues, is that Hannibal and Will's romance is largely *closeted* but that this, paradoxically, offers a more queerly subversive account of their desires by rendering them not wholly *knowable*. His compelling thesis is that this general refusal of assimilation in *Hannibal* (and 'Mikkelsen's well-dressed cannibal' in particular) 'reactivate[s] a position of dangerous queerness increasingly chased out of homonormative television'.⁶³ Against the contemporary rainbow representation of acceptably

out characters elsewhere in mainstream culture, *Hannibal* maintains its queer radicality as disruptive, disjunctive and difficult. As Lee Edelman notes, the specificity of queerness lies in its capacity to figure 'what [the Symbolic order] can neither fully articulate nor fully acknowledge'.⁶⁴ The queerness of *Hannibal* is thus in its very refusal of queer denotation.

Hannibal and Will's relationship never becomes *overtly sexual* – and queer relations need not be indexed solely to sexual acts – but theirs *is* a profoundly embodied, visceral yearning for one another that is constantly teetering on the edge of something more explicitly carnal. It might *begin* as a relation of 'pure intimacy in a non-physical way', as Fuller put it around the time of season two, but over the course of season three in particular, subtext and connotation gradually *approach* the level of sexual-textual denotation.⁶⁵ As Hannibal's former supervising therapist and murderous accomplice-hostage, Bedelia Du Maurier has intimate knowledge of his allure and its threat, and it is she who pushes Will to acknowledge his relationship with Lecter. Disbelieving, he asks her: 'Is Hannibal in love with me?' To which she responds, 'Could he daily feel a stab of hunger for you and find nourishment in the very sight of you? Yes. But do you ache for him?' (season 3, episode 12). The question is left to hang in the air, once again refusing a definitive articulation but when he is united with Hannibal at series' end, it seems that Will's response can only be affirmative.

Furthermore, this evocation of desire as hunger and nourishment taps into the programme's erotically-charged gastronomic imagery – for example where Hannibal warns Will over breakfast, 'I'm very careful about what I put into my body' (season 1, episode 1) – and leads to Diana Fuss' reading of *Hannibal* precursor, *The Silence of the Lambs*, as a film of 'oral insatiability', depicting the cannibalistic incorporation of the other in a markedly Freudian way: as 'an endless process of killing off and consuming the rival in whom the subject sees itself reflected'.⁶⁶ This holds true for *Hannibal*, perhaps even more so than for Demme's film where Fuss' evidence is limited to the relatively brief interactions between


Lecter and Clarice Starling. Fuller's series presents a broader canvas on which to paint these themes and explore their variations. Hannibal remains the enthusiastic cannibal, devouring his enemies one meal at a time; and Clarice's forebear, Will, absorbs the identities of those around him (particularly Lecter) in a continual process of identificatory incorporation. Along these same lines, Lecter also turns friends, colleagues and rivals into cannibals themselves, surreptitiously feeding them human morsels at extravagant dinner parties. This is, moreover, vividly evoked by Bedelia during her public lecture on her time in Hannibal's thrall. As she stands before a screen displaying *Christ in Limbo* (painted by a follower of Hieronymus Bosch, c.1575, and depicting a great gaping maw), her imagery reinforces the series' oral organisation: 'Before Dante, we spoke not of the "Gates of Hell", but the "Mouth of Hell". My journey of damnation began when I was swallowed by the beast' (season 3, episode 10). As Adam Phillips summarises, the oral drive is organised around a basic impulse: "I want to eat this or spit it out." (...) "I want it inside me, or outside me".⁶⁷ Bedelia was once on the inside but now attempts to position herself on the outside of Hannibal's world.

However, as well as devouring beasts, Bosch's works are replete with defecating bodies such as the gold-shitting miser and the bird-headed monster in the "Hell" panel of 'The Garden of Earthly Delights' (c.1490-1510), and I'd suggest that the implication of Bedelia's lecture is that, having been *swallowed* by 'the beast' but now standing before us, she must have been *spat* – or indeed *shat* – out by Hannibal at some point. The latter possibility – and evocation of anality more generally – is something the series works hard to avoid. Of course, male homosexuality is not reducible to anal eroticism (nor vice-versa) but the way in which *Hannibal* so markedly disavows any such implication is in itself significant: indeed, considering a series otherwise seemingly unrestrained in its baroque depictions of bodies in extremis, a psychoanalytic perspective would compel us to attend to this (symptomal) refusal. The developing homoerotic attraction between Will and Hannibal is

suggested by penetration: most notably in 'Mizumono', where Hannibal holds Will's head tenderly and sorrowfully caresses his face. But when Lecter stabs him, he *guts* Will from hip to hip in a transverse incision that goes to the bowels directly, bypassing the rectum. That this was a *loving thrust* is confirmed in the next season when Will revives in hospital: Dr Chilton tells him, 'He knew exactly how to cut you (...) He wanted you to live' (season 3, episode 2). Hannibal and Will connect bodily in this instance but face-to-face and tip-to-belly, unlike the configuration in Bacon's *Two Figures* of what Edelman calls the 'sodomitical scene'.⁶⁸ In short, anality is refused in *Hannibal* even while an intimate connection is made.

This incident also points to a more general avoidance of both male genitalia and buttocks in *Hannibal*, where they are most frequently obscured by framing and lighting.⁶⁹ 'Digestivo' (season 3, episode 7) offers a striking example where Hannibal is detained at Mason Verger's hog farm. Such a scene of male bondage is itself worthy of Bacon: Hannibal derives as much satisfaction from his treatment as do his tormentors and Mikkelsen's muscular body – held taught by ropes – is suspended, motionless, like a Muybridge plate or one of those famous sides of meat. However, such imagery does not reach the same degree of erotic intensity as Bacon's compositions, even while his violence is far outstripped by Fuller's drama. The side-on framing severs Mikkelsen at the waist, while top and side lighting pick out his shoulders and the edges of chest and face (Fig. 18). An alternate frontal shot foreshortens his body almost entirely and encases his bloodied visage between two posts; here the same directional lighting now highlights the tops of his thighs, framing the impenetrable shadow of his groin (Fig. 19). Such presentation returns us to Miller on *Rope*: bleeding wounds abound in *Hannibal* but the anus remains hidden and the sodomitical scene denied as Hannibal remains alone, unlike Bacon's couplings. Even where their homoerotic relationship reaches its peak in series finale, 'The Wrath of the Lamb' (season 3, episode 13), it is sealed with a lingering embrace and almost-kiss – rather than anything more direct –

before Hannibal and Will take their deathly plunge over the cliff-top. Thus, while trafficking in the same desires, *Hannibal* never quite gives up the goods in the same way as Bacon's work.



Figs. 18 and 19. Hannibal bound, 'Digestivo'.

The Shudder-Image as Enjoying Substance

It is, then, this *resistance* that once again puts us on the track of the shudder-image and the possibility of a second thesis. As a technique in *Hannibal* the shudder-image does not always pertain to Abigail's narrative. It persists *after* the revelation of her guilt and *beyond* her disappearance and death, being interspersed across all three seasons. In light of the series' quasi-Baconian eroticism, then, I propose – *more speculatively* – that the shudder-image in general could be seen as a judder of enjoyment, not unlike *orgasmic convulsion*: the toe-curling, leg-shaking, buttock-clenching shudder of *Hannibal*'s audio-visual flesh. Barker contends that Carolee Schneemann's *Fuses* (1967) 'celebrates the female orgasm' not only through its overt content but also through its haptic visual strategy: presenting an array of textures – 'rough scratches, tickling fur and dust speckles, dappled light and color, smooth dissolves and fluttery, quick cutting' – as an evocation of female desire.⁷⁰ Relatedly, I suggest that *Hannibal* achieves an ecstatic quality that cannot be reached within the diegesis but through the convulsions of the shudder-image. Where *Fuses* functions in an overtly heterosexual context, here the formal strategy is a stand-in for the bodily union of Will and Hannibal that is suggested only at the very end of the series: offering audio-visual expression to a queer enjoyment that they themselves are not permitted. Thus, psychoanalysis, which has so far explained *why* this shudder must be refused from the screen, can – in dialogue with queer theory – also give an account of *how* it is imaged nonetheless.

The concept of *jouissance* takes on many forms in Lacanian theory but its key feature in this context is its excessive intensity: signifying "orgasm" as well as "enjoyment" in French, it takes the subject into the realm that Freud designates as beyond the pleasure principle where we suffer our satisfactions. It is in *this* sense – as the body flooded with ecstatic energy – that I here characterise the shudder-image. Indeed, what Lacan calls in Seminar XX the 'enjoyment of the body (*jouir du corps*)' is a powerful experience evoked

later in the Seminar by Bernini's sculpture of Saint Theresa in orgasmic rapture.⁷¹ The shudder-image could therefore be understood as the *jouissance of the image* itself. This libidinal force evoked in *Hannibal* – what Lacan describes as 'the substance of the body, on the condition that it is defined only as that which enjoys itself (*se jouit*)' – is denied to the bodies of its protagonists but manifests instead on the body of the image. Where *jouissance* is refused diegetically, it returns as the image itself becomes the Lacanian 'enjoying substance (*la substance jouissante*)'.⁷² Moreover, as Zupančič reminds us, this is how psychoanalysis renegotiates Cartesian dualism: by theorising the independence of drive beyond biological need – not, for example, the satisfaction of eating but perhaps the enjoyment of hunger – and its repetition as what compels the *Todestrieb*. *Hannibal* gives expression throughout to this self-destructive surplus that splits satisfaction from within – what we might call the originary negativity of the drive – which, for Zupančič, 'undermines the classical divide body/spirit'. Psychoanalysis neither denies spirit, nor suggests that it proceeds straightforwardly from body. Instead, Lacan posits *jouissance* as a 'disturbed [*dérangé*] relationship to one's own body': its own internal interruption or division, where the subject appears.⁷³ This moves my framework from an apparent dualism of opposites, towards a *dialectical* understanding of psyche and soma that will allow me to resituate a psychoanalytic approach in relation to film-philosophy.

Hannibal's enjoyment ripples across the picture, in a space – these curious transitional images – stretching between the scenes of the drama that provide its source. It is not buried beneath the text but brought to its surface by the shudder-image. Differently from a Marksian approach, however, my concern in this instance is not so much whether these textures invite spectator interaction as it is the question of what they express within the image itself. MaryKate Messimer reads the sensuous depiction of food and gore in *Hannibal* as encouraging this haptic mode of viewer engagement, drawing us towards the image and

inducing what she describes as 'embodiment of the queer experience in the viewer'.⁷⁴ Such analysis is compelling – particularly in relation to sound – but spectatorship, as I've suggested, is not my focus. Instead, I claim that the shudder-image – as the shudder of the image-body – itself constitutes a form of audio-visual queer embodiment: expressing at the level of form the satisfaction Hannibal and Will are unable to achieve at the level of content. Equally, in a psychoanalytic context, where Todd McGowan discusses 'the point of traumatic enjoyment' in cinema, it relates to the disclosure of the gaze (as an encounter with the object) *for the spectator*, rather than the jouissance of the image itself.⁷⁵ The shudder-image, as a disturbed relationship to its own image-body, is the very enjoying substance of *Hannibal*.

In its Baconian problematisation of sex and ecstatic aesthetics, the series thus compels us towards Edelman's contention that jouissance is itself *queer*. Jouissance signifies the excess within sex; while, as Edelman argues, queerness 'exposes sexuality's inevitable coloration by the drive: its insistence on repetition'. Figuring only 'senseless pulsions', queer-jouissance thus entails a undoing of teleology, of the assumed end-goal orientation of sexuality.⁷⁶ Where Freud's *Trieblehre* had already denaturalised sex by divorcing its object from its aim, Lacan further insists that procreation is a mere by-product of the detours of enjoyment: 'the end of jouissance does not coincide with what it leads to, namely, the fact that we reproduce'.⁷⁷ For Edelman, jouissance thus puts reproduction *at risk* by unmooring sex from this supposed design. Jouissance is not simply the "joy" of bodily congress but the point at which the sexual becomes deranged from itself. *Hannibal* demonstrates that sex entails enjoyment of the death drive 'that always insists as the void in and of the subject, beyond its fantasy of self-realization, beyond the pleasure principle'.⁷⁸ Jouissance has the (queer) force of this negativity, and its drive demands satisfaction even at the subject's expense: as in Will and Hannibal's cliff-top plunge at the last.

For Edelman, queerness thus embodies this impossible-Real of jouissance that internally divides the Symbolic; it is a pressure – the *Drang* of the death drive – that endlessly pushes us to no end in particular, other than its own ends. Indeed, as Lacan notes: '[j]ouissance is what serves no purpose'.⁷⁹ The supposed “establishing shots” that constitute the shudder-image throughout *Hannibal* are both formally excessive and narratively redundant: they mark that which does not fit. As I have noted, these brief time-lapse sequences are not stipulated systematically in Fuller’s scripts – and a simple wide shot/chyron would suffice from a narrational perspective – so the motif goes beyond this function while occupying the interstices of the story. The shudder-image manifests formally the Real of enjoyment and, in figuring the unassimilable libidinal force of Will and Hannibal’s attraction, presents a vision of queer satisfaction. The vibrato sound and image are therefore a formal expression constituting nothing but its own enjoying substance.

Hannibal thus compels us to develop a new a paradigm: from *film thinks* in established film-philosophy to *film enjoys* in a properly Lacanian sense. This movement from screen thinking to screen enjoyment allows for a conceptualisation of media reduced neither to mind nor to body, but dialecticising this relation as the jouissance of the sound-image itself. The shudder-image in *Hannibal* stands in, at the level of narrative content, for the “repressed” idea of gay male orgasm and can be extrapolated from here to be considered in terms of a general operation or formal logic of jouissance expressed as aesthetic excess. Conceiving of the screen as *enjoying thing* thus offers an alternative both to previous, psychoanalytically-informed film theory and to the dominant modes of film-philosophy. For example, the shudder-image – as *la chose jouissante* – relates what, in her famous ‘Anatomy of Film Bodies’ (by which is meant representations of human bodies on screen), Linda Williams separates as the bodily excesses of sex (pornography) and violence (horror).⁸⁰ Where, for Williams, the ecstasy of orgasm and the shudder of ecstatic violence pertain to different generic paradigms, *Hannibal* reveals their

dialectic: *in the alienation of the body from itself through its own enjoyment*. Moreover, this model overcomes the explicit somatophobia of Frampton's filmind – while also offering an alternative understanding of film-embodiment to those approaches grounded in phenomenology – by emphasising the relation of *unconscious* thought to the bodily expression of jouissance: not just *the thing that thinks*, but *the thing that enjoys*.

Coming Together

In the field of its study, the orgasm is posed as a question implicating both psyche and soma. As Karly-Lynne Scott observes, 'The historical trajectory of sexological definitions of orgasm (...) demonstrates a continuous negotiation of the physiological and psychological aspects'.⁸¹ Orgasmology thus poses a mind-body problem that touches on *Hannibal* and seems to reconnect the two sides of my analysis of the shudder-image, which would similarly implicate body and mind together. It would be tempting, then, to present my understanding of the shudder-image – and indeed the sexological understanding of the orgasm, the latter constituting one specific frequency of that image's vibrations – as a synthesis: a sort of conceptual *pineal gland*, which, to evoke Descartes' speculations, was posited as the site where psyche and soma were conjoined. Their particular conjunctions in *Hannibal*, moreover, might recall Bataille's own meditations on the pineal gland and his myth of the 'pineal eye', that irrational blind spot in Enlightenment knowledge: particularly where Bataille describes the moment in which 'existence itself shudders and attains a level where there is nothing more than a hallucinatory void, an odour of death that sticks in the throat'.⁸² As we've seen, such moments abound in the Baconian aesthetics of *Hannibal*.

However, beyond the spectacle of violence, there is a clear dimension of *enjoyment* in such scenes: and it is this jouissance – as that which divides the Lacanian subject – which unifies my conceptual framework for audio-visual analysis. There is, as Freud discovered,

enjoyment in the symptom: indeed, it is what sustains the symptom and necessitates the arduous process of a psychoanalysis. It is found in the strange expression on the Rat Man's face as he recounted fantasies of torture, which Freud could only interpret as 'horror at pleasure of his own of which he himself was unaware'; and again where Lacan observes that jouissance, 'in the sense in which the body experiences itself', is 'at the level at which pain begins to appear'.⁸³ *Hannibal* thus allows us to understand that enjoyment is how psychoanalysis interprets the mind-body question dialectically. Rather than Frampton's disembodied panpsychism, Shaviro's and Pisters' monism, or Sobchack's emphasis on body over unconscious mind, my analysis of *Hannibal* allows me to propose a properly Lacanian renegotiation of the film-philosophical Cartesian dualism – conceiving of jouissance in relation to the internal division of the subject, as both the substance of the unconscious and the derangement of the body from itself – as a new mode of screen theorising: from the thing that thinks to the thing that enjoys.⁸⁴

The convulsions of the shudder-image attest to the short-circuiting of sex and knowledge as conceptualised in psychoanalysis. They are an audio-visual expression of overwhelming jouissance – of Abigail's guilt; of a capacity to commit, and crucially to derive satisfaction from, extreme violence; of Will's lust and its forbidden realisation – circling around Lecter's charismatic centre. *Hannibal* reminds us that enjoyment of the symptom is satisfaction of the death drive, which repeats in the jouissance of *la petite mort*. As such, the programme maintains contact with Bacon throughout, drifting from the intimations of existential violence to the queer intimacy of Hannibal and Will's attraction that frame this article's first and second theses. Moreover, I would claim that these interpretations are not inconsistent but a reflection of both the polysemy of jouissance itself and the shifting emphasis of *Hannibal* from police procedural to gay romance. The shudder-image thus expresses an internal division around which the series itself operates, while marking a

transition in *Hannibal* from the story's realm of *symptom* (first thesis), sustained by an expectation of meaning, to that of what Lacan calls '*sinthome*' (second thesis), the meaningless enjoyment that determines the subject, registered at the level of style.⁸⁵

My approach therefore insists upon 'the proper dialectical analysis of a form': where, as Žižek observes, 'a certain formal procedure' stands in for an element of the content. In order to grasp the 'all' of the narrative, we must grasp this key feature of the form.⁸⁶ The shudder-image in *Hannibal* is just such a procedure. This is not, however, an Althusserian 'symptomatic reading': the shudder-image is not what is *absent* from the text or *invisible* within it. Its significance might not be immediately apparent but it nonetheless plays out across the *surface* of the image rather than constituting a 'second' text beneath the first.⁸⁷ Neither is the shudder-image a straightforward phenomenological disruption, as in those moments in season one where Will's overt anguish causes the frame to shake. The shudder-image moves independently of such direct content, indicating formally the disturbances of the text itself as a stain of enjoyment. It materially embodies the deadlock of the Real – what distorts it from within – in audio-visual form. A full interpretation of *Hannibal* – which is available to us through Lacan rather than conventional film-philosophy – requires us to include these symptomal – even *sinthomatic* – moments as indicative of the "meaning" of the story's "all".

Moreover, having now established the specificities of the concept of the shudder-image, it will finally be possible to consider its relation to the Deleuzian taxonomy presented in the *Cinema* books. We might consider the shudder-image as situated somewhere between those forms of the movement-image identified as *affection-image* and *impulse-image*. As Deleuze puts it, '[a]ffection is what occupies the interval' – occurring between perception and action (i.e., I perceive, I am affected, I act) – and the affection-image is thus an image of a feeling or a quality. It has two paradigmatic instances on screen: the close-up of the face (e.g., Falconetti's

Jeanne d'Arc) and what Deleuze calls the *any-space-whatever*, where the broader mise-en-scène takes on an affective quality (e.g., Expressionist chiaroscuro). Clearly, *Hannibal*'s shudder-image is not a close-up but its deserted landscapes might evoke the menacing shadow-world Deleuze describes. However, these are not the anonymous spaces identified by the concept's originator, Pascal Augé (airports, bus stops, waiting rooms), nor are they – as Deleuze would have it – totally abstract, 'extracted (...) from a determinate space'.⁸⁸ There is an affective quality moving through them, but each shudder-image remains, nonetheless, a defined and identifiable place with a significant relation to the narrative.

Alternatively, we might consider a further interstice that Deleuze introduces, between affect and action, as the impulse image. This category is less easily described but finds Deleuze at his most psychoanalytic: the French (*l'image-pulsion*) evokes the drive (*la pulsion*) and is associated with the fetish and even the symptom, although these pertain specifically to images of characters and their objects. There is, moreover, a space of the impulse-image: an 'originary world' or setting possessed by primordial forces (e.g., the desert in *Greed*).⁸⁹ In this context, *Hannibal*'s cutaways might be considered a sort of *drive-image* but where, for Deleuze, Death Valley provides an indeterminate *background* from which Stroheim's film emerges, the shudder-image foregrounds the landscape itself as it is traversed by the force of its own enjoyment. Further, the shudder-image does not constitute a time-image: it might interrupt the scene but linear chronology remains intact. Finally, then, the shudder-image is not an image of thought but an image *in the place of thought*, arising where an impossible, unconscious idea is registered instead in the form of the body: it thus remains irreducible to Deleuze's categories. Such distinctions are necessary in order to better define our concepts, but they do not foreclose dialogue.

My analysis of *Hannibal* suggests the possibilities for a psychoanalysis *after* film-philosophy, responding to the intersections and interactions of these interests. Indeed, where

a film-phenomenologist such as Saige Walton develops her discussion of cinema's 'baroque flesh', she examines Bernini's Saint Teresa and notes that it is Lacan who emphasises the 'state of bodily orgasm' in the work. Walton argues that her cinematic baroque is 'a fundamentally correlative aesthetic that entangles one body with another',⁹⁰ and what we have in the form of *Hannibal*'s shudder-image – I'd suggest – is a hint of the entanglements of psychoanalysis with its disciplinary other(s) in the field of Screen Studies: the possibilities of a Lacanian film-philosophy. Lacan's early understanding of *jouissance* and the body was famously in dialogue with Bataille. Bataille, as well as the psychoanalytic Bersani (and even Žižek), are points of reference for Shaviro, who nonetheless aims to escape Freud in favour of Deleuze and Guattari; while Zupančič finds in the death drive some common ground between Lacan and Deleuze. Deleuze of course wrote his book on Bacon, while Lacan seemingly never referenced the artist. However, Bacon's works are a significant area of psychoanalytic investigation in the recent collection, *Francis Bacon: Painting, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis*, which both notes that Bacon himself owned a copy of Lacan's *Écrits* and offers Lacanian analysis of his art. *Hannibal*, as the drama of a psychoanalysis gone awry, presents the nexus of these intermingling interests and thus offers a starting point for renewed conversations about minds, bodies and screens while encouraging us to look for the *jouissance* within the image.

¹ Jacques Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton, 2007), p. 72.

² Cf. Kavita Mudan Finn and EJ Nielsen, 'Introduction: *A Love Crime*', in Kavita Mudan Finn and EJ Nielsen (eds) *Becoming: Genre, Queerness, and Transformation in NBC's Hannibal* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2019), pp. 2-3.

³ See, for example, Jessica Balanzategui's and Naja Later's 'Hannibal Lecter's Forms, Formulations, and Transformations' special issue of *Quarterly Review of Film and Video*, vol. 35, no. 6 (2018).

⁴ See Stacey Abbott, 'Not Just Another Serial Killer Show: *Hannibal*, Complexity, and the Televisual Palimpsest', in Balanzategui and Later, pp. 552-567; Michelle D. Miranda, "'Do You See?'" Clues, Reasoning, and Connoisseurship', in Kavita Mudan Finn and EJ Nielsen, pp. 215-238; Astrid Schwegler-Castañer, 'The Art of Tasting Corpses: The Conceptual Metaphor of Consumption in *Hannibal*', *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies*, vol. 32, no. 5 (2018), pp. 611-628.

⁵ As well as the contributions to Balanzategui and Later, and Mudan Finn and Nielsen (cited above), see, for example, Evelyn Deshane, 'Hannibal's Refrigerator: Bryan Fuller's Response to Fans' (Critical) Rage', in Rebecca Williams (ed.) *Everybody Hurts: Transitions, Endings, and Resurrections in Fan Culture* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2018), pp. 11-124.

⁶ See, for example, Angela Ndalians, '*Hannibal*: Baroque Horror Vacui and the Theatre of the Senses', in Lisa Beaven and Angela Ndalians (eds) *Emotion and the Seduction of the Senses, Baroque to Neo-Baroque* (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2018), pp. 257-282; Alberto N. Garcia, '*Hannibal* and the Paradox of Disgust', *Continuum*, vol. 33, no. 5 (2019), pp. 554-564; Tara Lomax, 'Cannibalizing Montage: Slicing, Dicing, and Splicing in Bryan Fuller's *Hannibal*', in Balanzategui and Later, pp. 644-565.

⁷ See, for example, Jeff Casey, 'Queer Cannibals and Deviant Detectives: Subversion and Homosocial Desire in NBC's *Hannibal*', *Quarterly Review of Film and Video*, vol. 32, no. 6 (2015), pp. 550-567; Ellie Lewerenz, "'Adapt. Evolve. Become.'" Queering *Red Dragon* in Bryan Fuller's *Hannibal*', in Mudan Finn and Nielsen, pp. 54-73.

⁸ See Jason Bainbridge, 'Making a Meal of the Law: *Hannibal*, Taste and the Limits of Legality', in Balanzategui and Later, pp. 601-613; Richard Logsdon, 'Merging with the

Darkness: An Examination of the Aesthetics of Collusion in NBC's *Hannibal*', *The Journal of American Culture*, vol. 40, no. 1 (2017), pp. 50-65; Karen Felts, "'Some Lazy Psychiatry, Dr. Lecter'" Teacups, Narrative, and *Hannibal*'s Critique of Psychoanalysis', in Mudan Finn and Nielsen, p. 196.

⁹ Jane Stadler, 'The Empath and the Psychopath: Ethics, Imagination, and Intercorporeality in Bryan Fuller's *Hannibal*', *Film-Philosophy*, vol. 21, no. 3 (2017), p. 423.

¹⁰ See Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer, *Studies on Hysteria*, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 2 (London: Hogarth Press, 1955).

¹¹ Freud, 'Some General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks', SE 10, p. 157.

¹² Freud, 'From the History of an Infantile Neurosis', SE 17, p. 76.

¹³ See Robert Sinnerbrink, *New Philosophies of Film: Thinking Images* (London: Continuum, 2011), pp. 14-15; David Martin-Jones, 'Introduction: Film-Philosophy and a World of Cinemas', *Film-Philosophy*, vol. 20, no. 1 (2016), pp. 6-23.

¹⁴ Sarah Cooper's work offers a third term here, charting that which has been excluded from screen thinking as what she calls *The Soul of Film Theory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

¹⁵ Steven Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 256. Shaviro would disavow such mind-body dualism in favour of a Spinozan parallelism. Similarly, Sobchack would reject it for Merleau-Ponty's chiasm of body and world. However, despite these philosophical disputations, they remain exemplary of the *methodological* Cartesianism in film-philosophy.

¹⁶ Vivian Sobchack, *The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 3-4.

¹⁷ See Laura U. Marks, *The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. xi-xii; *Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 10.

¹⁸ Daniel Frampton, *Filmosophy* (London: Wallflower Press, 2006), pp. 73, 160. This would align Frampton with those theorists Sobchack identifies as 'either embarrassed or bemused by bodies that act wantonly and crudely at the movies', *Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. 53. *Hannibal* itself, I will argue, presents just such a wanton and crude (screen-)body in relation to a (screen-)mind.

¹⁹ Patricia Pisters, *The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 20-21. Pisters *does* emphasise the materiality of the brain but frames this in terms of neuroscience and – like Shaviro – Deleuzian and Spinozan philosophy.

²⁰ Alenka Zupančič, *Why Psychoanalysis? Three Interventions* (Copenhagen: NSU Press, 2008), pp. 7-8, 9.

²¹ See Todd McGowan, *Psychoanalytic Film Theory and The Rules of the Game* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 56-84.

²² McGowan's ground-breaking psychoanalytic project is explicitly framed as "film theory after Lacan", which is to say an attempt to reclaim and resituate the concept of the "gaze" in relation to established film theory (i.e., Mulvey) and to put it in a properly Lacanian context. McGowan's vital endeavour does not explicitly engage with those contemporary developments in film-philosophy that I have outlined here and so runs largely in parallel to (rather than overlapping with) the psychoanalytic intervention I propose in this article. See *The Real Gaze: Film Theory After Lacan* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007).

²³ Bryan Fuller, 'Apéritif', <<http://livingdeadguy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Hannibal-Ep-101-Aperitif.pdf>> accessed 15 July 2020.

²⁴ Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989), pp. 55-56.

²⁵ This cutaway to the exterior is not detailed in Fuller's script, 'Amuse-Bouche', <<http://livingdeadguy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Ep-102-Amuse-Bouche.pdf>> accessed 15 July 2020.

²⁶ Sinnerbrink, 'Stimmung: Exploring the Aesthetics of Mood', *Screen*, vol. 53, no. 2 (2012), p. 149.

²⁷ Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling/Repetition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 9.

²⁸ Freud and Breuer, *Studies on Hysteria*, p. 285.

²⁹ Žižek, *Sex and the Failed Absolute* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), p. 147.

³⁰ See Sobchack, *The Address of the Eye*, pp. 104-115.

³¹ See Jennifer Barker, *The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

³² See, for example, Mark Fisher, *The Weird and The Eerie* (London: Repeater, 2016).

³³ See Antonio Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (London: Vintage, 2000); Vittorio Gallese and Michele Guerra, *The Empathic Screen: Cinema and Neuroscience* (Oxford: OUP, 2020); David Bordwell and Noël Carroll (eds), *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996).

³⁴ See Bordwell, *Narration in the Fiction Film* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 49, 283.

³⁵ Rick Altman, 'Dickens, Griffith, and Film Theory Today', in Jane Gaines (ed.), *Classical Hollywood Narrative* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), p. 34.

³⁶ See <http://livingdeadguy.com/shows/hannibal/>.

³⁷ Noël Burch, *To the Distant Observer: Form and Meaning in Japanese Cinema* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 160-161.

³⁸ Bordwell, *Ozu and the Poetics of Cinema* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 122-3; Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 17.

³⁹ Similarly, in their survey of film theory, Elsaesser and Hagener suggest – apropos of Deleuze and Annette Michelson – that 'it makes more sense to speak of a camera consciousness than to perpetuate the body-mind dualism', *Film Theory: An Introduction through the Senses*, 2nd edn. (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 184. However, this does not allow for the dimension of the *unconscious* and their focus is more generally on spectatorship, which – as I will explain below – is not my primary concern in relation to *Hannibal*.

⁴⁰ Fisher, *The Weird and the Eerie*, p. 11.

⁴¹ Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 331. Kracauer similarly describes a spectator's *shudder*, but here it is in the disjunction of memory and image before an old photograph or movie (not unlike Barthes' later encounter with the *punctum*). See *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 49, 56.

⁴² Angela Ndalani, 'Hannibal: A Disturbing Feast for the Senses', *Journal of Visual Culture*, vol. 14, no. 3 (2015), p. 281.

⁴³ Felix Guattari, *The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011), p. 75.

⁴⁴ *Inside the Labyrinth: The Making of 'The Silence of the Lambs'* (Jeffrey Schwarz, 2001).

⁴⁵ David Sylvester, *Interviews with Francis Bacon* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1999), p. 17.

⁴⁶ Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (London: Continuum, 2003), p. x.

⁴⁷ Parveen Adams, *The Emptiness of the Image: Psychoanalysis and Sexual Difference* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 109.

⁴⁸ The former position is expressed by Ben Ware: 'The convulsive bodily shudder thus becomes the Baconian aesthetico-ethical experience *par excellence*', 'Looking the Negative in the Face: Modernist Painting After Affect', in Ware (ed.), *Francis Bacon: Painting, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2019), p. 141.

⁴⁹ Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, pp. 15, 41.

⁵⁰ Gregory Salter, 'Francis Bacon and Queer Intimacy in Post-War London', *Visual Culture in Britain*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2017), pp. 84-99.

⁵¹ See Sylvester, *Interviews with Francis Bacon*, p. 116.

⁵² Michael Peppiatt, *Francis Bacon: Anatomy of an Enigma* (London: Phoenix Giant, 1997), p. 161.

⁵³ See Todd VanDerWerff, 'Hannibal's Bryan Fuller on Mason Verger and an incredibly ambitious sex scene', <<https://tv.avclub.com/hannibal-s-bryan-fuller-on-mason-verger-and-an-incredib-1798268249>> accessed 15 July 2020.

⁵⁴ Slavoj Žižek and Mladen Dolar, *Opera's Second Death* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 211.

⁵⁵ See Rebecca Feasey, 'Beekeeper Suits, Plastic Casings, Rubber Gloves and Cling Film: Examining the Importance of No-Sex Sex in *Pushing Daisies*', in Basil Glynn, James Aston and Beth Johnson (eds), *Television, Sex and Society: Analyzing Contemporary Representations* (New York: Continuum, 2012), pp. 65-77; Helen Wheatley, *Spectacular Television: Exploring Televisual Pleasure* (London: IB Tauris, 2016), pp. 190-203.

⁵⁶ Lacan, *...ou pire* (Paris: Seuil, 2011), p. 186.

⁵⁷ See Zupančič, *What Is Sex?* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017), pp. 7-8, 16. Moreover, as Zupančič insists, such censorship/taboos around sexual representation do not “cover up” the Real of sex but affirm it as the gap in knowledge itself (p. 142).

⁵⁸ See Casey, ‘Queer Cannibals’, p. 559.

⁵⁹ D. A. Miller, ‘Anal Rope’, *Representations*, no. 32 (1990), p. 118.

⁶⁰ See Emma Didbin, ‘Hannibal: Bryan Fuller talks season 4, sexual fluidity, and how Will became Clarice Starling’,

<<http://www.digitalspy.com/tv/hannibal/interviews/a667077/hannibal-bryan-fuller-talks-season-4-sexual-fluidity-and-how-will-became-clarice-starling/>> accessed 15 July 2020.

⁶¹ Amber Raley and Jennifer Lucas, ‘Stereotype or Success? Prime-Time Television’s Portrayals of Gay Male, Lesbian, and Bisexual Characters’, *Journal of Homosexuality*, vol. 51, no. 2 (2006), p. 23.

⁶² Cf. Steve Neale, ‘Masculinity as Spectacle’, *Screen*, vol. 24, no. 6 (1983), p. 8.

⁶³ Sean Donovan, ‘Becoming Unknown: *Hannibal* and Queer Epistemology’, *Gender Forum*, no. 59, pp. 38, 47.

⁶⁴ Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), p. 26.

⁶⁵ Jim Halterman, ‘Bryan Fuller Breaks Down Homoerotic Charge of “Hannibal”’, <<http://www.newnownext.com/bryan-fuller-breaks-down-the-homoerotic-charge-of-hannibal/04/2014/>> accessed 15 July 2020.

⁶⁶ Diana Fuss, *Identification Papers* (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 93.

⁶⁷ Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips, *Intimacies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 100.

⁶⁸ Lee Edelman, 'Seeing Things: Representation, the Scene of Surveillance, and the Spectacle of Gay Male Sex', in Diana Fuss (ed.), *Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories* (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 99.

⁶⁹ Cf. Peter Lehman, *Running Scared: Masculinity and the Representation of the Male Body* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2007), p. 30.

⁷⁰ Barker, *The Tactile Eye*, p. 24.

⁷¹ Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge* (New York: Norton, 1998), p. 24. Also: 'you need but go to Rome and see the statue by Bernini to immediately understand that she's coming (*qu'elle jouit*)' (p. 76).

⁷² Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, p. 23.

⁷³ Zupančič, *What Is Sex?*, p. 88; Lacan quoted in Zupančič, p. 89.

⁷⁴ MaryKate Messimer, "'Did You Just Smell Me?': Queer Embodiment in NBC's *Hannibal*", *The Journal of Popular Culture*, vol. 51, no. 1 (2018), p. 191.

⁷⁵ McGowan, *The Real Gaze*, p. 10.

⁷⁶ Edelman, *No Future*, p. 27.

⁷⁷ Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, p. 120.

⁷⁸ Edelman, *No Future*, p. 25. Messimer similarly references Edelman's commentary on jouissance as a framework for Will and Hannibal's demise; however, the description of the characters entering 'the utopian space of unlimited joy and possibility' ('Did You Just Smell Me?', p. 190) is entirely at odds with Edelman's emphasis on the radical *negativity* of enjoyment.

⁷⁹ Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality*, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Linda Williams, 'Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, Excess', *Film Quarterly*, vol. 44, no. 4 (1991), p. 9.

⁸¹ Karly-Lynne Scott, 'Orgasms without Bodies', *World Picture Journal*, no. 10 (2015), <http://www.worldpicturejournal.com/WP_10/Scott_10.html> accessed 15 July 2020.

⁸² Georges Bataille, 'The Pineal Eye', in Alan Stoekl (ed.), *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 86. Leila Taylor draws a fascinating connection between *Hannibal* and Bataille's theory of eroticism; however, this model remains bound to a cosmic dualism of Eros and Thanatos and romanticised self-destruction, rather than the dialectic of the (death) drive and its immanent disturbance as expressed in the shudder-image. See 'The Amorous Annihilation of Will: An Examination of Georges Bataille's *Death & Sensuality* through Bryan Fuller's *Hannibal*', *Horror Studies*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2019), pp. 45-59.

⁸³ Freud, 'Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis', SE 10, p. 167; Lacan quoted in Nestor Braunstein, 'Desire and Jouissance in the Teachings of Lacan', in Jean-Michel Rabaté (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Lacan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 103.

⁸⁴ See Zupančič, *What Is Sex?*, p. 53. Indeed, Shaviro himself is more receptive to this "new" psychoanalysis, as professed in 'The Cinematic Body REDUX', *Parallax*, vol. 14, no. 1 (2008), pp. 50-51.

⁸⁵ See Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, p. 75.

⁸⁶ Žižek, *Sex and the Failed Absolute*, p. 237.

⁸⁷ See Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital* (London: NLB, 1970), pp. 27-28. This would, then, also be the contrast with Altman's model (referenced above).

⁸⁸ Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 65, 111.

⁸⁹ Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, p. 123.

⁹⁰ Saige Walton, *Cinema's Baroque Flesh: Film, Phenomenology and the Art of Entanglement* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), pp. 243n17, 21.