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Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment

Abstract

The subject of this study was the **Resistência Nacional Moçambicana** (Renamo) movement, its involvement in the Mozambican civil war, and the way in which Renamo was presented to the outside world.

Renamo began fighting against the Marxist Frelimo government in Mozambique in 1977, receiving limited Rhodesian and subsequently South African assistance. Renamo was the subject of an almost unprecedented propaganda war, and labelled a foreign proxy. The work examines the shortcomings of media and academic coverage of the Mozambican civil war in general and Renamo in particular.

The study attempts to explain the success of the Renamo insurgency, suggesting that much of Renamo's support was the result of ingrained rural and regional opposition to the Frelimo government. The study traces the intellectual origins of Renamo back to Frelimo itself, examining how Frelimo had earlier been split between Marxist and nationalist tendencies.

The study examines how Frelimo managed to portray Renamo as a terrorist organisation without popular support, contrasting this image with the markedly different first-hand observations of over twenty independent visitors to Renamo-controlled parts of Mozambique.

The study examines how it was possible for virtually every branch of informed opinion to have misjudged the forces at play within the Mozambican civil war. The work argues that Renamo was a genuinely Mozambican phenomena and should be seen as having enjoyed considerably more popular support than had hitherto been accepted. Much of the thesis outlined in the work was borne out by both the 1994 and 1999 election results, in which Renamo won 112 and 117 out of 250 Parliamentary seats.

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**Context Statement
Made in Support of an Application
to Middlesex University
for the Award of a Research Degree (PhD)
On the Basis of Published Works**

**‘Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case
for Reassessment’**

**by David Hoile
Published in London
in 1994**

Introduction

The history of Mozambique from 1962 until 1992 was one of intense political conflict coupled with virtually non-stop guerrilla warfare. There have been two long-standing guerrilla wars fought within Mozambique since 1964. The first was initiated and directed by Mozambican nationalists grouped within the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Mozambique Liberation Front or Frelimo). This was fought from 1964 onwards in opposition to the Portuguese colonial authority within Mozambique, and ceased some months after the April 1974 *coup d'état* in Portugal, which brought to power an administration committed to the decolonisation of Portugal's overseas possessions. This policy led to negotiations which saw Frelimo handed political power within Mozambique by the Portuguese government on 26 June 1975. The

second insurgency within Mozambique was that fought by the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Mozambique National Resistance or Renamo). This was directed against the post-independence Frelimo government and its policies. This conflict was fought from 1977 onwards and saw the military involvement of several of Mozambique's neighbours. The Zimbabwean, Tanzanian, Zambian and Malawian governments all deployed military formations at various times during the conflict in support of the Frelimo government and against Renamo forces.

Renamo's insurgency can be said to have been successful in as much as it forced the Mozambican government to the negotiating table, and to accept a multi-party system of government in Mozambique. A cease-fire, negotiated by the Italian government and the Vatican-based St Egidio religious community, ended the Mozambican civil war in 1992. This cease-fire was then followed by a two year United Nations-supervised transitional period which culminated in 1994 with internationally-supervised multi-party elections, the first in Mozambique's history.

It is a matter of record that throughout the course of the second Mozambican civil war, the general perception of the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* internationally was a very negative one. The standard projection of Renamo was that it was an organisation that was nothing more or less than a Rhodesian and South African creation and creature divorced from, and alien to, Mozambique and Mozambicans. Additionally, it was claimed that it was a terrorist organisation made up of "armed bandits" which lacked either a political constituency or geographical base.¹ The

standard Frelimo line unhesitatingly pressed for a military solution, and was unable to concede any thought of a negotiated settlement of the situation.

The work submitted in this application, **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment**, was the first systematic re-evaluation both of the causes and dynamics of the second Mozambican civil war, and the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*. It was the first detailed assessment of the many negative claims made about this organisation. It built on two other works: **Mozambique: A Nation in Crisis**, a previous book I had written which had been published in 1989, which cast a critical eye of what was seen at the time as “accepted wisdom” with regard to Mozambique; and on **Mozambique: Propaganda, Myth and Reality**, a monograph published in 1991.² I had been able to travel for thousands of kilometres across Renamo-held areas of Mozambique both during the civil war and into the partial, and then general, cease-fire periods. What I had seen did not match what I had read about Renamo in the generally accepted literature. The study thus sought to present an alternative perspective on Renamo, one which explored the view that far from being a foreign invention, Renamo had in effect emerged from, and it could be argued was the political heir to, the Mozambican nationalism that had originally shaped both Frelimo and Frelimo’s political orientation. **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment** presented the view that Renamo could also be seen as being particularly close, and responsive, to a considerable section of Mozambique’s largely rural population, a population that had become increasingly alienated by government policies. The work also examined why it was that Renamo came to be as internationally isolated, misunderstood and misrepresented during, and even after, the

Mozambican civil war. Largely written in 1992 and 1993, it was published in February 1994 - several months before the October 1994 multi-party election in Mozambique. This election was informative in that for the first time ever, and in electoral terms which could not be disputed, it demonstrated the extent of the support for Renamo within Mozambique. In so doing, it undermined a considerable body of generally accepted work claiming the opposite.

Even before the 1994 elections, my book was able to compare and contrast academic, media, Mozambican government and related claims about Renamo with the reality of the situation in Mozambique as the country opened up to outside observers during the two year transitional period supervised by the United Nations prior to the elections.

Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment outlined for the first time, and in some detail, the academic, non-governmental organisational, media and solidarity network and its generally supportive attitude towards the Frelimo government, and the reasons for that support. Central to the work was chapter three, 'Propaganda, Myth and Reality'.³ This chapter was the first systematic study of both the propaganda used against Renamo during the Mozambican civil war, as well as the international structures which echoed and disseminated the Mozambican government's standard projection of Renamo.

Any study of Renamo, and assessments of its political nature, composition, and constituency during the Mozambican civil war, however, was made difficult for many reasons. A major limitation of this study at the time was that anything to do with

Renamo was surrounded by considerable propaganda and disinformation.⁴ Eight years after the end of hostilities, and five years after the 1994 multi-party election, there is still a considerable amount of secrecy surrounding the recent conflict, and the exact nature of the full military involvement of Mozambique's neighbouring states such as South Africa and Zimbabwe.

A significant limitation of any work on Renamo was that much of the academic study of the 1977-92 insurgency had been shaped by academics and commentators who were either ideologically committed to, or publicly sympathetic with, the parties involved. There was also very little opportunity for field studies by academics, who were then reliant on previously published sources - which, in most cases, were clearly propagandistic and ultimately of little value, save that of providing examples of propaganda to analyse and assess in their own right. Very little of record *per se* had been written on the 1977-1992 insurgency at the time of the writing of **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment** - and very little since.

A related and equally significant problem was that media coverage of the Mozambican civil war, and Renamo's role within it, had been disjointed by the obvious limitations placed upon media outlets and journalists by the respective sides to the conflict. It was also constrained by the nature of guerrilla war itself. Much the same could be said about attempts to comment on events within Mozambique from a human rights perspective. Additionally, there are serious doubts over the objectivity of some of the media coverage, particularly that concerning the Renamo insurgency, given the political sympathies of several key correspondents. The fact that both the

Reuters and *Agence France Presse* correspondents in Mozambique were full-time employees of the Mozambican government's news agencies, as well as self-evident political supporters of the government, is a case in point. Much the same observation could also be made with regard to the stance of most, if not all, the non-governmental organisations active in Mozambique - and particularly their respective head-offices outside of the country.

Accompanying all these difficulties was the fact that Renamo did not adequately document its history, perspectives, position or structures.

Renamo's Political Roots in Frelimo

Given the clear and quite successful attempts by the Mozambican government to write in effect the history of the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, and given Renamo's claim to have assumed the mantle of Mozambican nationalism as originally embraced by Frelimo, **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment** explored in detail both the origins, and subsequent history, of the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*.

Frelimo had been formed in 1962 in exile in Tanzania out of three Mozambican nationalist groups. Over the next few years a power struggle then unfolded between the older generation of African nationalists and a younger generation of activists whose political orientation was Marxist. As Frelimo's political and military struggle against the Portuguese intensified so did the internal power struggle within the

movement. The assassination of Frelimo's founding president sharpened the conflict. The younger Marxist group succeeded in gaining control of Frelimo's political and military structures. From Frelimo's own in-house histories **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment** demonstrated that the struggle within Frelimo had clearly been along political lines, with one group adhering to a black nationalist, small 'c' conservative perspective, which had more in common with Kenyan nationalist parties such as KANU, and the other being Marxists who followed a "progressive and revolutionary line".

Many nationalists within Frelimo who during and after the power struggle had come into conflict with the Marxist grouping left the movement when the grouping gained an ascendancy and formed or joined other Mozambican nationalist organisations. During the transitional period in Mozambique between the cease-fire in 1974 and the Portuguese hand over of power to Frelimo in 1975, there had been an expectation of some sort of election. A number of black political parties and organisations came into being, some of them led by figures who had been prominent in Frelimo before leaving as a result of the internecine struggles. The Portuguese chose to hand over power to Frelimo without holding any elections in Mozambique. Once in power it is a matter of record that Frelimo crushed its political opposition. In the 1990s, the government admitted, for example, that many of the key leaders of opposition to Frelimo in Mozambique were murdered in the mid-to-late 1970s.⁵

In the work submitted, it was argued that it was out of black Mozambican nationalist and political opposition to Frelimo that Resistência Nacional Moçambicana emerged,

particularly in the wake of the post-independence repression in Mozambique. Both of its presidents had been Frelimo members, and Renamo claimed that it represented the original black nationalist tendency within Frelimo which had come into conflict with the Marxist grouping that ultimately seized control of that organisation. Interestingly, prominent Frelimo party historians stated that Frelimo leaders also traced Renamo's roots back to the foundation of Frelimo in 1962. It is also clear that Renamo did receive Rhodesian and then South African support when these governments came into conflict with the Mozambican government.

Renamo Success and Support within Mozambique during the Civil War

As outlined in the study, the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* came to face considerable odds during its fifteen year-long insurgency. An organisation that grew from under one thousand men and women in 1979, it numbered twenty thousand lightly armed members ten years later. It faced government security forces that may have numbered up to one hundred and twenty thousand men strong. These forces were supplied with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of up-to-date Soviet military hardware including bombers and helicopters. In addition, Renamo faced a government army reinforced by thousands of Zimbabwean, Tanzanian, Zambian and Malawian soldiers and airmen. Perhaps as much as half of the Zimbabwean army and air force, one of the best armed forces in Africa, may have been deployed in Mozambique at the height of that country's involvement. The Zimbabweans acted much as the Soviet army had in Afghanistan in providing backbone to an increasingly demoralised Mozambican army.

As part of its attempt to explore and explain the military and political advances enjoyed, in the face of considerable odds, by Renamo in the 1980s, the study suggested several reasons for Renamo's success. It argued that there were two key factors. One was the schism and antagonism between rural and urban Mozambique which had existed prior to the civil war. This natural fault line, which had been exploited by Frelimo during its guerrilla war against the Portuguese, was clearly exacerbated by post-independence Frelimo policies such as forced villagisation, the removal of power from traditional chiefs and headmen, and moves against religion and traditional rural practices including bride-prices, polygamy and initiation ceremonies. The forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of Mozambican peasants into state-run communal villages not only dislocated traditional farming but created additional tensions as attempts to collectivise farming failed and resulted in grave food shortages. An additional cause of considerable grievance was the government's decree that the use of the Portuguese language was to be universalised - this in a country where Portuguese was the mother tongue to 1.23 percent of Mozambicans. Even Frelimo sympathisers were forced to admit that Frelimo's policies faced the "reservoir of cultural resistance of the masses".⁶ There is no doubt that Renamo was able to exploit this "cultural resistance" and that the overwhelming majority of its soldiers, recruited from the rural population, would have had first-hand experience of government attempts to impose a new order on their communities.

My book further documented the fact that the urban-rural schism was in turn accentuated by clear regional tensions. Both Frelimo, and Mozambique's post-

independence governments, had tended to be dominated by Mozambicans from the south of the country. Mozambique's two Presidents had come from one particular area in southern Mozambique. Additionally, many white, *mestiço* and Indian members of Frelimo were disproportionately prominent in the government of the country, further alienating many black Mozambicans. The capital of Mozambique, Maputo, was situated in the deep south. This gave rise to the sort of regional tensions that one sees in many countries throughout the world - tensions that are always exacerbated in time of conflict. In addition to having a social constituency amongst many of Mozambique's rural population, Renamo also came to be the focus for some of the regional alienation that resulted from perceptions of Frelimo as a party essentially of the south and non-Africans. Renamo had originally become active in the late 1970s in Manica and Sofala province in central Mozambique, and rapidly expanded into other provinces, including the most populous Zambezia and Nampula provinces in northern Mozambique.

The extent of Renamo's physical presence had always been a matter of considerable debate and disinformation. The study drew together the often-stated claims of the Frelimo government, repeated by various external commentators, that Renamo did not enjoy any level of popular support amongst the Mozambican population, and did not geographically hold any significant areas of Mozambique.⁷ These two claims were central to the standard projection of Renamo. These claims were extensively contradicted by those journalists and commentators mentioned separately below who had visited Renamo controlled parts of Mozambique. They all confirmed both popular support and control of large areas of Mozambique. Additionally, the United Nations,

as part of its role of supervising both transitional period and the election which followed, confirmed that Renamo either administered or controlled significant areas within 54 of Mozambique's 120 districts. Of these many were vast in size, and altogether they represented a major part of Mozambique. The UN did not include Renamo-held districts in Mozambique's northern-most Niassa province.

It is also clear that the South Africa government was itself probably unaware of the extent of the support for Renamo in Mozambique. It would appear that Pretoria genuinely believed, along with the Mozambican government, that the ending of its assistance to Renamo would mean the end of the organisation and its armed struggle in Mozambique. The opposite turned out to be the case.

Renamo and the Role of External Support

The standard Frelimo characterisation of Renamo was that it was nothing more and nothing less than a creation of the Rhodesian and South African governments. This perspective pointed out that the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* was formed in Rhodesia in 1976, and that from then, until the white-dominated regime was replaced by the government of Robert Mugabe, Renamo received military assistance from the Rhodesian government. This military assistance was then carried on from 1980 until 1985 by the government of South Africa.

My study pointed out, however, that there were clear contradictions within the claims made by Frelimo with regard to its Rhodesian genesis. Much is made by academics

and others of statements by Ken Flower, the head of the Rhodesian secret service, in his autobiography **Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981**, that Rhodesia had indeed been instrumental in bringing Renamo into being.⁸ A closer study of the references to Mozambique revealed that several statements in Flower's autobiography, and particularly in an appendix which was said to be a copy of secret Rhodesian document written in 1974 entitled "Flechas and the Formation of the Mozambican National Resistance", are factually and chronologically untrue. This document, for example, would have dated Renamo to 1974, when it is clear that it came into being in 1976. Moreover, in an 1987 interview Flower stated that the assistance afforded to Renamo by the Rhodesian government was limited and that some two or three, and at the very most five, of his men were ever involved with the organisation. This assistance was then contrasted with the several hundred Chinese and Soviet bloc military and security personnel who were responsible for training Frelimo personnel in its Tanzanian base camps during Frelimo's war against the Portuguese, when Frelimo was a guerrilla movement. I also pointed out that Frelimo was itself formed outside of Mozambique, in Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of Tanzania.

It is clear that Renamo did receive military assistance from South Africa from 1980 until 1984. In 1984 the South African and Mozambican governments signed the Nkomati accord. This accord secured a number of South Africa's regional and security concerns, and was signed from a South African position of strength. South African assistance to Renamo ended almost immediately. My study attempted to put South African assistance to Renamo in context by comparing the assistance afforded

to Renamo with the massive assistance given to the anti-government UNITA guerrilla movement in Angola. Clearly perceived as a much more strategic issue, South Africa had intervened militarily at brigade-strength from time to time and had supplied UNITA with vast quantities of weapons and logistical support. Pretoria's assistance to Renamo paled into insignificance by comparison, and even this support was ended when it became politically expedient for the South Africans to do so.

The book also documented claims by the Frelimo government at various stages that Renamo was receiving assistance from the Israeli, Kenyan, Malawian, Portuguese, Moroccan and American governments.

Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment also introduced an interesting legal perspective on the issue of whether Renamo was a Mozambican organisation engaged in a popular uprising against the Frelimo government or whether it was nothing more than a South African puppet. The Commercial Court in London was called upon to give a ruling on a sizeable insurance claim relating to Mozambique. Between July 1982 and January 1983, the Beira to Feruka oil pipeline in Mozambique had been attacked on several occasions. A number of oil tank installations in Beira had also been destroyed. These attacks had been carried out by Renamo forces. The oil stocks had belonged to Zimbabwean-based oil companies who claimed on their insurance policies. Lloyds of London, the underwriters, refused the claim, citing policy clauses that excluded coverage if losses were incurred by civil war, rebellion or insurrection. The Zimbabwean plaintiffs put forward the standard Frelimo perspective that Renamo was a foreign creation without any political

objectives or support from the Mozambican people. Their activities did not therefore comprise civil war, rebellion or insurrection. Mr Justice Saville's judgement was in favour of Lloyds. Mr Justice Saville's judgement commented on the fact that propaganda had led to true positions being obscured, concealed and misrepresented. He found that despite any Rhodesian or South African involvement, Renamo was a Mozambican movement with at least some level of support from Mozambicans.

Independent Visitors to Renamo Areas in Mozambique

In attempting to present a picture of those parts of Mozambique held by Renamo during the civil war, the study documented, for the first time in one work, the impressions and comments of those independent observers who had visited Renamo-administered areas of Mozambique during the civil war, and before the 1994 election. It also recorded the comments of foreign observers who had been detained while in these areas. Amongst these visitors were Sharon Behn, the Lisbon correspondent of the *Independent* newspaper, correspondents from *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Holger Jensen of the *Washington Times*, ITN's foreign correspondents Michael Nicholson and Jeremy Thompson, Lord Michael Cecil of the *Sunday Times*, Italian journalist Amerigo Grucce, German television producer Dittmar Hack, French journalist Dr Eric Gerard and Portuguese telejournalist Rui Paulo da Cruz, all of whom visited Renamo areas at various times during the conflict, and all of whom produced written or television accounts of their impressions. They all challenged standard perceptions of Renamo.

Of even more interest and value was the study's documenting of the impressions of those individuals who had been detained by Renamo. These included British journalist Nicholas Della Casa, who was held for eighteen months as a suspected spy, Kindra Bryan, an American missionary nurse who together with several other missionaries was detained by Renamo and spent three months with the organisation; and Ian Robertson, a British agricultural worker whose agricultural scheme was attacked by Renamo, and who spent over 6 weeks with Renamo. As former captives of Renamo they were perhaps the most independent of the sources that could have been presented. They were also significant as had all been moved around vast tracts of Renamo-held areas of Mozambique, in some cases from one end of Mozambique to another. They covered thousands of kilometres. All three of these detainees, along with several others held for periods of time by Renamo, had, when released, positive things to say about Renamo, the extent of Renamo's control over rural Mozambique, and Renamo's relationship with the population it came into contact with. And, unlike refugees in Mozambique, or in government-controlled camps in neighbouring countries, these witnesses had the freedom to speak their mind. One American journalist, William Finnegan, actually records his annoyance with the fact that an Italian priest he interviewed, who had been held for forty days, and who had travelled hundreds of kilometres with Renamo, refused to demonise his captors.⁹

These and other observers also noted at least rudimentary Renamo administrative structures in place.

Academia, Frelimo and the Mozambican Civil War

Most of the academic works which came to be accepted as standard texts on the history and political development of Mozambique, and particularly the period of its history between the mid-1970s and the 1990s, tended to present what could best at best be described as an imperfect picture of events within that country, especially with regard to the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*.

Much of the post-1975 literature on Mozambique, and on the subsequent civil war between the Frelimo government and Renamo which unfolded from 1975 onwards, was dominated by what can best be termed the *cooperante* school.¹⁰ *Cooperantes* were defined by Frelimo leader Samora Machel as “militants who share a common cause...in order to help with national reconstruction”. Another definition was that of Gillian Walt, a British health policy lecturer, and herself a *cooperante*, who stated that cooperantes are “skilled workers who were politically sympathetic to the aims of the Mozambican government”. Frelimo was seen as a party of the left, and most *cooperantes* were motivated by an ideological affinity to Frelimo’s Marxism. This school was therefore made up of political sympathisers, many of whom had either actively worked with Frelimo during the years of its struggle against the Portuguese or those who had worked within the emergent Frelimo state for several years. These were people for whom Frelimo in struggle and in power within Mozambique represented a utopian socialist movement and state, and for whom the Portuguese were colonial imperialists. In **Political Pilgrims**¹¹, Paul Hollander’s study of socialist idealists who visited the Soviet Union at the height of the excesses in that country and

returned praising the system, Mozambique was cited as a latter-day equivalent among radical Western intellectuals.¹² For these “political pilgrims” Renamo was nothing more than a reactionary South African surrogate devoid of any resonance within the Mozambican population. This school shaped a considerable amount of what were generally accepted as the definitive texts on Mozambique, the development and struggle of the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* for independence from the Portuguese and the resulting conflict with the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*.

Typical of this school was Professor Allen Isaacman and his **A Luta Continua: Creating a New Society in Mozambique** (1978) followed by his 1983 work, co-authored with his wife, **Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution**.¹³ Both had worked for Frelimo in Mozambique after independence, lecturing at Eduardo Mondlane University, and were subsequently very active in pro-Frelimo solidarity work in the United States. Equally typical was Professor Barry Munslow’s **Mozambique: the Revolution and its Origins**.¹⁴ Munslow taught at Liverpool and Manchester University, and had also taught at the Eduardo Mondlane University. Bertil Egero’s **Mozambique: A Dream Undone; The Political Economy of Democracy**, was published in 1987.¹⁵ Egero had associated with Frelimo in the 1960s, and worked as a *cooperante* from 1978-80. There is in some cases a certain continuity between writing on the two insurgencies. Several writers on Mozambique had already written extensively during the war of independence. North American academics John Saul and Professor William Minter, for example, both had pro-Frelimo work published in the early 1970s: Minter’s **Portuguese Africa and the West** in 1972, and Saul’s “Frelimo and the Mozambique Revolution” in **Essays on**

the **Political Economy of Africa** in 1973. Both Minter and Saul had lived in Tanzania in the 1960s and had worked with FRELIMO. Minter, for example, lectured in the FRELIMO political school in Tanzania in the 1960s. Saul subsequently edited **A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique** in 1985. Saul was candid enough to state that for scholars such as himself academic preoccupations are shaped by the ongoing process of ideological class struggle. Minter produced the 1989 report, **The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-Participants**, as well as **Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique** in 1994.¹⁶ Minter received the 'International Combatant Star' in 1989 for services to the Frelimo party.

Dr Joseph Hanlon's 1984 book, **Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire**, while touching on a number of Frelimo mistakes, still took the then orthodox line denying Renamo's Mozambican identity.¹⁷ Many Non-Governmental Organisations and their staff members had close links with the Mozambican government, many having worked as *cooperantes*. Ian Bray, for example, wrote **Chicualacuala: Life on the Frontline**, published by Oxfam in 1987. Bray had been Oxfam's assistant field director in Mozambique 1985-86. He had worked for the Mozambican government before working for Oxfam and was subsequently associated with both the Mozambique Information Office and the Mozambique Angola Committee, the first a Mozambican government media outlet, and the latter a pro-Frelimo solidarity group. Oxfam also published Julian Quan's **Mozambique - A Cry for Peace** in 1987: Quan subsequently left Oxfam to work for the Mozambican government. Derrick Knight's

equally pro-Frelimo study, **Mozambique - Caught in the Trap**, was published by Christian Aid in 1988.

The *cooperante* grouping were often bound by rigid class-centred Marxist dogma in their analyses. The other two schools of thought were revisionist, one somewhat more hesitant than the other.

A revisionist generation of commentators was led by two French anthropologists. Michel Cahen's 1987 study **Mozambique: La Revolution Implosee** and Christian Geffray's **La Cause des Armes au Mozambique: Anthropologie d'une Guerre Civile**, published in 1990, argued that previous perspectives on RENAMO were flawed in that they essentially denied the Mozambican nature of the RENAMO phenomena.¹⁸ Interestingly, the Cahen/Geffray school itself developed out of the *cooperante* grouping. The debate this revision engendered was typified by the exchanges in the **Southern African Review of Books** in 1988-89.¹⁹ This revisionism was picked up by several other writers such as Dr Tom Young. His 1990 **African Affairs** article "The MNR/RENAMO: external and internal dynamics" was a pivotal revision of some of the hitherto generally accepted perspectives on Renamo.²⁰ Alex Vines's **Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique**, published in 1991, also took a partially revised line on Renamo and the dynamics of the Mozambican civil war.²¹

There was also what can be described as a minority Renamo-sympathetic grouping made up of Professor André Thomashausen, Sybil Cline and myself. Thomashausen's 1983 "The National Resistance of Mozambique" in **Africa Insight**, and his "The

Mozambican National Resistance” in **Weerstandsbewegings in Suider-Africa**, published in 1987, constituted the first moves towards presenting an alternative viewpoint on Renamo.²² Sybil Cline’s monograph **Anti-Communist Insurgents in Mozambique: The Fight Goes On** in 1989 presented the Renamo case following visits to both sides of the conflict by the author.²³ My own **Mozambique: A Nation in Crisis** in 1989 questioned much of what had previously passed for academic and media coverage and analysis of Renamo and the circumstances within Mozambique in which Renamo had come to the fore.

Academics and Renamo: No Text to Analyse

Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment presented the first examination of the academic community’s failure to get to grips with the Renamo phenomenon. This was for several reasons. The study made the point that Frelimo exercised a virtual monopoly on the flow of news within Mozambique, and that it either controlled or shaped much of the information coming out of Mozambique concerning the country and its conflict. Virtually all of the standard texts on Mozambique had been written by *cooperantes*, and others who were either Frelimo supporters or clearly Frelimo sympathetic; this in turn meant that any attempt to produce a balanced academic study based on the written and published materials available would be difficult. Additionally, given the very difficult security situation throughout virtually all of Mozambique for most of the civil war, meaningful research or field work was impossible. There was, as Michel Cahen stated, simply no text to

analyse.²⁴ This clearly did not prevent several attempts, attempts flawed to a greater or lesser extent by the author's inability to get to grips in any real sense with Renamo.

Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment critically analysed Alex Vines' **Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique**, one of the then somewhat more balanced attempts to study Renamo, which was published in 1991 and presented as the most comprehensive study to date. Vines, however, had produced this study without meeting or interviewing any of Renamo's national leaders or national council members, or even one member of Renamo in Mozambique. Neither had he visited any of the considerable areas within Mozambique controlled by Renamo. Nor did Vines interview any of the many, independent, observers who had visited these areas and who had met with Renamo leaders and members. Despite these, and other serious flaws, **Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique** was described as "encyclopaedic" by its publishers. The book was riddled with factual errors and while accepting the semi-revisionist perspective that Renamo was essentially Mozambican in nature, Vines did not break free from the by now standard repetition of other Frelimo claims about Renamo. It was disappointing that while conceding that "censorship and propaganda" had "obscured" study of the Mozambican conflict, there was no attempt to review or assess that propaganda. Poor research resulting in stereotyped imagery was ultimately just as limited as studies shaped by ideological commitment and fervour.

The Mozambican conflict and international media coverage

Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment also examined the projection of a Frelimo perspective through international media outlets. It was the case that generally speaking international media reporting on the Mozambican civil war reflected Frelimo government positions and carried most Frelimo government claims, and generally either did not or were unable to carry any Renamo comment. This was for several reasons. All the news agencies, and, with very few exceptions, most of those foreign correspondents working in Mozambique, were almost exclusively geographically confined to Maputo, the Mozambican capital, or one or two other urban areas. Given the pressing need to file news copy, the news agencies and journalists would file what news was available to them - mostly material originated by the Mozambican state news agency. The study also showed that there was also a surprising overlap between those representing international media organisations and those actually working for the Mozambican government news agencies. Iain Christie, for example, doubled as the Reuters correspondent in Mozambique from 1980 onwards while also working as a senior Mozambican government information official. He had worked for the Mozambican state news agency and then headed the English language external service of the state-controlled Radio Mozambique. An open political sympathiser, Christie had worked for Frelimo in Tanzania several years prior to Mozambique's independence in 1975. In 1989 he was awarded the 'Internationalist Combatant Star', along with William Minter. Paul Fauvet was another example of a *cooperante* who came to hold significant international media positions in Mozambique. The *Agence France Press* bureau in

Mozambique was actually listed as care of Radio Mozambique, with Fauvet as the bureau chief. Fauvet was also the Maputo correspondent for the Guardian and other newspapers. Fauvet was then a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain. There is little doubt that both would have qualified as “political pilgrims”. Their position in Mozambique would have been the equivalent perhaps of Reuters and *Agence France Presse* having as their Moscow correspondents during the Cold War period people who worked full-time for Tass, Pravda or Radio Moscow.

My work further documented that Joseph Hanlon, an unambiguous supporter of Frelimo, reported from Mozambique for the BBC from 1979-1985, and wrote on Mozambican issues for the *Guardian*, *Observer*, *Africa Confidential* and other newspapers. Hanlon’s 1984 **Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire**, clearly reflected a Frelimo line on most issues, and particularly Renamo. It is certainly significant that, of nine foreign news bureaux listed in Mozambique in 1991, there was only one, a Portuguese news organisation, without any obvious ideological or employment connections to Mozambican government and its state information outlets. In addition, given Zimbabwe’s military and political commitment to the Frelimo government, the efficient ZIANA news agency reinforced the Mozambican government’s positions with respect to Renamo and the civil war.

As part of its study of the role of the international media in reporting on Renamo and the Mozambican civil war, **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment** examined two major news reports which claimed very serious abuses of human rights and the law of war by Renamo. Both were subsequently admitted to

be inaccurate. The study also examined the reporting accuracy of one of the few independent foreign journalists who was actually based full-time in Mozambique and travelled as much as he could around the country during the civil war.

In mid-1991, the state-owned *Noticias* newspaper claimed that Renamo had been involved in the massacre and mutilation of one thousand Mozambican civilians in and around the town of Lalaua in the northern province of Nampula. Although Renamo vigorously denied the claims, Iain Christie, the Reuters correspondent in Mozambique, filed the story and the Reuters report was carried by countless newspapers and media outlets around the world. Coverage of the claims as carried in the *Independent* and *Guardian* in Britain were perhaps typical of the use of the Reuters report internationally. They ran articles of 375 and 236 words respectively with the *Independent*'s headline reading 'Severed heads on shop shelves after Renamo massacres 1,000'. Associated Press also ran with the story. Renamo denied the claims. It was only after international journalists attempted to do on the spot follow-up stories, and demanded to be shown the site, that the facts of the matter eventually emerged. Instead of one thousand civilians having been murdered and mutilated, some forty-seven pro-government militiamen had died in a clash with Renamo forces. Reuters admitted its error some days later, but not before considerable damage had once again been done to Renamo's image internationally. Very few, if any, of the news outlets which carried the original Reuters report would have bothered to have subsequently corrected it.

The second example studied involved the Mozambican government's claims that Renamo forces had used chemical weapons on its forces in southern Mozambique in January 1992. The Mozambican government claimed that there had been five fatalities. Renamo denied the allegation. Given the gravity of the claim, the United Nations as well as the South African and British governments conducted detailed investigations into the affair. Despite the fact that all three investigations were not able to support Frelimo's claims, both the London *Times* and *Le Monde* claimed that there had been conclusive evidence of Renamo's use of chemical weapons. The *Times* unilaterally increased the number of Frelimo fatalities to fifty, and *Le Monde* stated that eighty soldiers had been killed. The British government, closely allied to the Frelimo government and no friend of Renamo's, officially described the *Times* article as "misleading".

The two instances mentioned above were interesting and informative. They were also unusual in that they were sufficiently grave for immediate, and objective, media and other attention to be focused upon them and for these allegations against Renamo to be found inaccurate. As the vast number of claims and allegations made against Renamo by the Frelimo authorities were considerably less high profile, they tended to be reported as they appeared on the international news wires or from correspondents in Mozambique, without any further investigation or attempts at verification.

Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment also examined the reporting from Mozambique of Karl Maier, who reported from Mozambique for the *Independent* newspaper for several years. Although Maier's work compared well

with much of the partisan coverage of the Mozambican conflict, it was nonetheless flawed. It still carried as fact many Frelimo claims subsequently seen as at best questionable and at worst inaccurate propaganda. It was not only Maier's reporting of "facts" that was often questionable. Maier's personal assessments and analysis was also often demonstrably flawed. A prime example were his repeated statements that Renamo was uncontrollable and undisciplined, and that the Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama would be unable to control his men or observe the 1990 partial cease-fire and the 1992 general cease-fire. In the cold light of day, this analysis was subsequently proven to be clearly inaccurate.

The study also looked at Renamo's apparent inability to put its case to the international community. It could be said that Renamo simply did not prioritise putting its case forward in the media. To an extent it did not care what the outside world thought. Additionally, Renamo experienced considerable funding difficulties and was unable to adequately fund any media work that it might have wished to have seen carried out. Unlike almost any other modern insurgency, Renamo did not have rear-bases and support facilities in neighbouring countries during the civil war. Any support it may have had from Rhodesia and South Africa was limited and clandestine. By contrast, during its guerrilla war against the Portuguese Frelimo was openly established in Zambia and Tanzania, where it was publicly represented and from where Frelimo ran media offices. Because of these logistical as well as passport difficulties, Renamo was forced to rely to act as spokesmen on long-standing, and ultimately unsuitable, Mozambican political refugees outside of Mozambique. They were very often mired in the personality clashes and internecine strife of exile politics.

There came a time, however, when Renamo did realise that the way it was seen internationally was hindering a negotiated political settlement of the conflict, and it did begin to address, at least in part, the media issue as well as the need to have representatives overseas who were trusted by the Renamo leadership.

Frelimo and international solidarity structures

At least in large part because of its socialist orientation, Frelimo had from its earliest days the advantage of being able, as it were, to “plug” into international solidarity structures. Pre-independence familiarity with these international structures, as well as organisations such as the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee, the World Peace Council and Organisation of Solidarity with Afro-Asian Peoples, was expanded upon in the years following Frelimo’s assumption of power in 1975. Through its automatic membership of various international and multi-lateral organisations, its various embassies throughout the world, and pro-Frelimo solidarity groups in various countries, Frelimo intensified its international work from 1980 onwards. Given its standard projection that Renamo was a South Africa creation, it was able to highlight its perspective on Renamo within many of the well-organised anti-apartheid structures that had by then come into being.

By the late 1980s, for example, the European Campaign Against South African Aggression on Mozambique and Angola was able to marshall pro-Frelimo solidarity groups in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. There

were also very active pro-Frelimo solidarity groups in the United States, Canada and Australia. As an example of a national Mozambique solidarity movement in action, the study showed that the Mozambique Angola Committee in the United Kingdom was in turn active in the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the British Defence and Aid Fund, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, Institute for African Alternatives, the National Association of Local Government Officers, and the National Union of Railwaymen 'Rail Against Apartheid', all of which ran projects with regard to Mozambique that unconditionally reflected Frelimo positions.

Non-Governmental Organisations and the Mozambican Conflict.

The work submitted also touched on the positions taken by the many non-governmental organisations that were active in Mozambique during the civil war. Some of the written work originated by authors who worked for non-governmental organisations in Mozambique has already been mentioned. **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment** documented some of the very close links between several internationally-reputable non-governmental organisations and the Mozambican government and Frelimo party. A large number of workers had worked for both the Mozambican government and non-governmental organisations at different times. Even if there was no political affinity between many of the expatriates who worked for international non-governmental organisations, their scope for accurately assessing the situation throughout most of the country was very limited. They only worked in those areas of Mozambique under government control, mainly in or about major urban areas. The non-governmental organisations and their staff were

reliant on the good-will of the government to carry out their work in Mozambique, and many held contracts from foreign governments and international bodies to work or provide services in Mozambique. These were contingent on Mozambican government approval. As was outlined in my book, for whatever reason, several key international non-governmental organisations, many of whom had significant access to the governments in the Western countries, were yet another platform for standard Mozambican government projections about Renamo. Several were vocal in attributing responsibility for the violence in Mozambique to the South African government, asserting that Renamo was a terrorist organisation and a South African surrogate force, as well as presenting Frelimo's politics in a positive light.

The study examined, for example, the work of Dr Ken Wilson, a noted refugee researcher associated with Queen Elizabeth House at the University of Oxford. Dr Wilson could not be described as a *cooperante*, and clearly stated that he saw himself as an independent researcher. Dr Wilson produced several publications which echoed essentially second or third-hand accounts of Renamo, claiming that Renamo was a brutal and coercive organisation and that life in Renamo-held areas was punitive. While not doubting Dr Wilson's integrity, my book did challenge his claim to be independent. The simple fact was that he had never visited *any* of the Renamo-held areas about which he spoke and wrote so definitively. His research had been in Frelimo-controlled areas of Mozambique and in refugee camps in Malawi and Zambia. He recognised the assistance of the Mozambican, Malawian and Zambian governments - all of which were at war with Renamo. His studies were funded by non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam and Christian Aid, agencies

implacably hostile to Renamo given their close association with the Mozambican government. Dr Wilson had also done work for the Mozambican government. The fact that Dr Wilson, and researchers like him, however sincere they may have been, were simply unable to independently assess the situation in Renamo areas called into question the credibility and reliability of their published work on the Mozambican conflict, Renamo and Renamo-held areas. Also undermining their credibility was the fact that they often relied upon flawed and questionable sources in the absence of any first-hand field work.

Human rights Commentators and the Mozambican Conflict

The study carefully analysed what became known as the Gersony report. Published in April 1988, the **Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique** had been commissioned by the American State Department and prepared by Robert Gersony, a consultant to the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs. Simply put, Gersony interviewed one hundred and ninety-six refugees and displaced persons in twenty-five refugee camps in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa, ten of which were in Mozambique. From these interviews Gersony extrapolated that Renamo had been responsible for the deaths of one hundred thousand civilians. Only three percent of complaints concerned Frelimo. Faultlines in the report were immediately evident. Gersony never at any stage visited any of the Renamo-held areas of Mozambique in which these extrapolated deaths were said to have taken place. Gersony was unfamiliar with Portuguese or any of the local Mozambican languages and dialects.

He had to work with local translators. In some of the countries government officials actually sat in on the interviews. Amongst the other drawbacks in his work, Gersony admitted that the majority of those interviewed could not count accurately above the number ten. Several other commentators on Mozambican affairs during the civil war commented on the simple unreliability of refugee interviews. Gersony's claims were further contrasted with the work submitted by several other sources such as Vines, *Agence France Presse*, the *Indian Ocean Newsletter* and even Christian Aid, sources which stated that there was considerable pro-Renamo sentiment in many refugee camps. Perhaps the most significant point made in respect of the Gersony report was that it was commissioned and produced by the American government which, at that time and right up until the Mozambican peace and election process, was implacably hostile to Renamo. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Gersony report suited clear and identifiable American foreign policy towards Mozambique, whose government Washington was actively politically and militarily supporting, in serving to further demonise Renamo.

Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment compared the Gersony report to the infamous Bryce Report in 1915. A noted historian and diplomat, Lord Bryce chaired a committee which was tasked with compiling Belgian refugee accounts of German atrocities and mistreatment of civilians in Belgium. Allegedly based on 1,200 depositions, and presented in the form of a legal document, and published by the British government's propaganda co-ordinating body, the Bryce report was the origin of most of the First World War atrocity stories regarding German soldiers bayoneting children, and cutting off of children's hands and

women's breasts. Significantly, a Belgian commission of enquiry in 1922 was unable to corroborate a single major Bryce report allegation.

The Gersony report does not really qualify as a human rights report. There were other publications which did present themselves as human rights studies. Many of the same limitations on accuracy and material that applied to academics and the international media, however, also applied to those who sought to document and assess the human rights situation during the Mozambican civil war. In some instances it was the same people responsible for academic, media and "human rights" work.

One example studied in this submission was **Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique**, published in 1992 by Africa Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch. The authors were Karl Maier and Alex Vines. The report was a typical example of material that had been broadly accepted as "objective" with regard to the Mozambican conflict, but which when examined in some detail proved to be grievously flawed. The report restated standard perceptions of the Mozambican conflict, the Frelimo government and Renamo. It relied on questionable sources and methodology. The difficulties for anyone writing on human rights to obtain accurate, reliable and objective material within a war situation are immense. And these were difficulties which the authors of the report were seemingly unable to overcome. Amongst the sources for material in this Africa Watch report were works by Hanlon, Munslow, Allen and Barbara Isaacman, Iain Christie, Julian Quan, and Derrick Knight. Hanlon was cited twenty-two times. Several of Africa Watch's sources had been decorated by the Frelimo government for services to the

Frelimo party. There are fifty citations of material produced by explicitly pro-Frelimo sources. Mozambican government and government-controlled media sources are cited on 37 further occasions. Maier and Vines also cite themselves fourteen times. Renamo is only cited as a source ten times. Once again, neither of the authors, nor any of those non-Renamo sources cited, had ever visited any of the extensive Renamo-held areas of Mozambique. Similarly, none of those independent observers and journalists who had visited these Renamo areas, or even those people such as Ian Robertson, Kindra Bryan or Nicholas Della Casa, all of whose human rights had in effect been violated by Renamo detaining them, were even mentioned let alone cited.

Even in presenting material alleged to be interviews with Mozambican civilians, the report did not present or explain the methodology used. In a sense this human rights report was exactly what it was, a report written by a journalist and an academic, and as such reflected many of the flaws that had come to dominate media and academic coverage of the Mozambican conflict and particularly Renamo. This lack of sound methodology led to glaring contradictions within the report. My book documented, for example, that, while the report was unwilling to accept allegations that thousands of Mozambicans had been killed in the weeks, months and years following Frelimo's consolidation of power in Mozambique, because there were no lists of names, the report in almost the same breath uncritically and unreservedly accepted the Gersony report's statistical extrapolation that Renamo was somehow responsible for one hundred thousand deaths. The report also did not make any mention of the quite extensive and systematic violations of human rights in Mozambique by the Zimbabwean military in their war against Renamo. And this despite the fact that both

Africa Watch and Vines himself had previously documented significant examples of such abuses.

The Peace Process

Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment examined the reform and peace process in Mozambique as it gradually unfolded. Having painted itself into a corner by denying the existence of any legitimate political opposition to its one-party state, towards the late 1980s Frelimo began to seek avenues of securing a negotiated settlement to the civil war. This shift was largely the result of a worsening military situation for Mozambican government forces. Unable to be seen to negotiate with an enemy it had for so long demonised, it was Mozambican church groups that initiated the first contact with the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* in August 1989. The Zimbabwean and Kenyan heads of state were approached by Frelimo to serve as mediators. They, together with church groups, recommended face-to-face negotiations between the two sides. These meetings came to be held in the Vatican, at the St Egeideo community, and were assisted by the Italian government. Five months of negotiations resulted in the 1990 partial ceasefire agreement whereby Zimbabwean forces were withdrawn to specified corridors inside Mozambique. In August 1992 the Mozambican general peace agreement saw the end of the Mozambican civil war. A United Nations-supervised transitional period, followed by internationally-monitored multi-party elections in late October 1994.

The 1994 Election Results

The results of the internationally-supervised multi-party elections held in September 1994 served as a vindication for several of the assertions made in my study. In the Parliamentary elections Frelimo secured 44.33 percent of the national vote. Renamo polled 37.78 percent of the vote, less than seven percentage points behind Frelimo. Frelimo returned 129 members of the 250 member legislature, and Renamo 112. The breakdown of the vote provincially was also interesting. Renamo won in five of Mozambique's ten provinces (Maputo city itself constitutes a separate province with Maputo province). Mozambique's most populous provinces of Nampula and Zambezia were amongst the five provinces won by Renamo. The election demonstrated clear Renamo majorities in the midlands and north of Mozambique. Frelimo did very well in Mozambique's three southern provinces, and won majorities in Mozambique's two most northern provinces. In the Presidential elections, the incumbent Frelimo President, Joaquin Chissano, won 53.30 percent of the vote to Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama's 33.73 percent. The election result came as a surprise to many outside commentators.

Conclusion

In challenging the generally-accepted image of the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment** was instrumental in attempting to present a clearer picture of the dynamics, issues and participants within the Mozambican civil war, which had been one of Africa's longest

running conflicts. It also presented a case study of an *information war* in a time of intense military conflict.

My work provided for the first time a history of Renamo which traced Renamo's claim to be a genuine Mozambican nationalist party, a party which claimed to be the heir to the original philosophy of Frelimo itself. It examined the history of Mozambican nationalism in the 1960s and into the 1970s. In exploring the view that Renamo had in effect emerged out of Frelimo, the study also examined the social dynamics which were reflected both in the physical makeup of Renamo membership and in the grass-roots support it enjoyed in significantly large geographical areas of Mozambique.

The study also examined, for the first time, the nature of the information war fought within the Mozambican civil war, a war in which one side, Renamo, did not really participate, and which therefore projected to the outside world an almost exclusively Frelimo perspective of circumstances and events inside Mozambique. It was undoubtedly significant that a vast amount of the media and academic coverage of the Mozambican civil war, and the political situation in the country at the time, was written by "political pilgrims" ideologically committed to the Frelimo party and government. In this respect the study is useful and can be used to assess similar examples of a one-sided projections of circumstances and events within a civil war. Events in Sierra Leone, I believe, may present a similar example of such circumstances.

I believe that academic scholarship failed in its assessment and analysis of the Mozambican conflict. Academic coverage of the Mozambican civil war, and particularly Renamo, was almost universally poor. This was at least partly explained by the fact that the field of Mozambican studies was dominated, at least from independence into the late 1980s, by writers who were often unconditional political supporters of Frelimo. There was also a related obvious disinclination by many academics and writers to challenge the “accepted wisdom” with regard to the conflict and Renamo. There were also, of course, the clear and immovable difficulties of conducting any meaningful field studies or research within Mozambique itself.

The study was also alone in its exploration of how the Mozambican civil war was prolonged by the propaganda imagery originated and projected internationally by the Frelimo government and its various media, academic and “solidarity” outlets. This served to internationally insulate the Frelimo government from reality - that is to say the need for a politically negotiated settlement of the conflict. There was also in any case the danger, as articulated by one of leading academics on Mozambique, that Frelimo had a capacity for believing its own propaganda. The danger of demonising one’s opposition to the extent of then making it very difficult to then seek to reach an accommodation with that enemy was clearly illustrated in this study of the Mozambican civil war. This demonisation resulted in sections of the international community, often thousands of miles away from the reality of the situation in Mozambique, reliant on exclusively Frelimo and Frelimo-related sources for their picture of events in Mozambique, often being the most vigorously opposed to any sort of reconciliation or political settlement with Renamo. At the end of the day, Frelimo

may well have had a more realistic view, both of the strength and popularity of Renamo, as well as the worsening security situation the government was facing, but it was then difficult for Frelimo to admit any such exaggeration or misinformation on its part. Frelimo had in effect painted itself into a corner. There is little doubt that the war was prolonged while Frelimo sought ways of manoeuvring its way out of this position and towards a peace settlement - a process that was not, at least originally, terribly well received by Frelimo's international supporters.

The work submitted presents a picture of the extraordinary and ultimately incestuous overlap between Frelimo sympathisers, *cooperantes*, Frelimo government employees, journalists, non-governmental organisation workers, and academics with regard to how the Mozambican civil war and Renamo were projected and generally seen internationally. This overlap greatly contributed to a systematic misreading of the Mozambican conflict and its participants. This in turn contributed to faulty assessments which led to questionable policy towards Mozambique and Renamo by several influential Western governments. And ultimately this may have again resulted in the war being prolonged.

The position outlined in the submitted work, that Renamo's support and constituency within Mozambique was based to a considerable extent on regional concerns about the domination of Frelimo and the Mozambican government by "southerners" was also born out in the multi-party election that followed in Mozambique some months after **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment** was published.

Similarly, the submitted work documented that by the end of the Mozambican civil war Renamo held considerable portions of Mozambique, and that the movement enjoyed a degree of popularity and support within these areas: this was borne out by the 1994 election results. It was clear that Renamo indeed had a very significant political constituency. Additionally, the position taken in **Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment** that Renamo was a structured, efficient and disciplined organisation was also borne out by the movement's adherence to the 1990 partial cease-fire, the 1992 general cease-fire, Renamo's compliance with its demilitarisation during the United Nations transitional period, its discipline and behaviour during the 1994 election, an election fraught with allegations of Frelimo vote-rigging. Renamo's acceptance of what it perceived as a flawed election result, and its active, full and democratic participation in the Mozambican parliamentary and political process since 1994 also underlined its disciplined nature.

The 1999 Mozambican election results once again reflected considerable electoral support for Renamo. In the Presidential elections, the Renamo candidate, Afonso Dhlakama, polled 47.7 percent of the vote, losing to incumbent Frelimo President Chissano, who secured 52.3 percent of the ballot. The Renamo party won 117 Parliamentary seats to Frelimo's 133 seats in the national legislature.

¹ See, as a typical example, the description of Renamo as “South African backed MNR guerillas” and “bandits” in Joseph Hanlon, **Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire**, Zed Books, London, 1984, xiii. See also statements such as “Renamo was founded outside of Mozambique, in the rooms of the Rhodesian and South African Secret Services as a ‘fake black liberation movement’ to disguise the regional concerns about Mozambique’s independence” by Hilary Andersson, in **Mozambique: A War Against the People**, Macmillan Press, London, 1992, p.47.

² David Hoile, **Mozambique: A Nation in Crisis**, Claridge Press, London, 1989, and **Mozambique: Propaganda, Myth and Reality**, Mozambique Institute, London, 1991.

³ This chapter built on an earlier examination of aspects of propaganda during the Mozambican civil war which appeared in David Hoile, **Mozambique: Propaganda, Myth and Reality**, Mozambique Institute, London, 1991.

⁴ There has been very little study of the quite considerable propaganda aspects of both of the conflicts. Keith Middlemas includes a chapter entitled “The Propaganda War” in **Cabora Bassa: Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa**, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1975. I had previously examined aspects of the propaganda campaign against Renamo in **Mozambique: Propaganda, Myth and Reality**, Mozambique Institute, London, 1991.

⁵ See, for example, the admission to that effect by FRELIMO President, and Mozambican Head-of-State, Senor Chissano, as reported by Radio South Africa, on

14 April, 1992 11:00 GMT. Chissano's admission that these political prisoners were killed is also noted in the United States Department of State's 1992 **Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices**, Department of State, Washington-DC, 1993.

⁶ Horace Campbell, "War, Reconstruction and Dependence in Mozambique", **Third World Quarterly**, Volume 6, Number 4, October 1984, p. 863.

⁷ With regard to statements that there were no Renamo-held areas in Mozambique see, for example, amongst others, William Finnegan, "A Reporter At Large", (2), **The New Yorker**, 29 May 1989, p.72; Margaret Hall, "The Mozambican National Resistance and the Reestablishment of Peace in Mozambique", paper presented to ISRI Conference in Maputo in 1991; Colin Legum, "Mozambique: the National Resistance of Mozambique" in **The Battlefields of Southern Africa**, Africana Publishing House, London 1988, p.245.

⁸ Ken Flower, **Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981**, John Murray, London, 1987.

⁹ William Finnegan, **A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique**, University of California Press, Berkley, 1992, footnote 12, p.262.

¹⁰ The Machel quotation appears in "Hospital speech", in **Boletim - A Saude em Mozambique**, Maputo, October 1976, special issue. The Walt definition appears in

Gillian Walt and Angela Melamed (Eds), **Mozambique: Towards A People's Health Service**, Zed Books, London, 1984.

¹¹ Paul Hollander, **Political Pilgrims**, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981.

¹² **Ibid**, pp. 275 and 277.

¹³ Allen and Barbara Isaacman, **Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution**, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1983. Isaacman had established previously himself as historian of Mozambique with work such as **The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique. Anti-colonial activity on the Zambezi Valley 1850-1921**, Heinemann, London, 1976.

¹⁴ Barry Munslow, **Mozambique: the Revolution and its Origins**, Longman, London, 1983.

¹⁵ Bertil Egero, **Mozambique: A Dream Undone: The Political Economy of Democracy, 1975-84**, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1987.

¹⁶ William Minter, **Portuguese Africa and the West**, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972; Minter, **The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-Participants**, Swedish International Development Agency, Stockholm, 1989; and **Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique**, Zed Books, London, 1994. John Saul, Saul (Editor), **A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique**, Monthly Review Press, New

York, 1985: "Frelimo and the Mozambique Revolution", in John Saul and Giovanni Arrighi (Eds), **Essays on the Political Economy of Africa**, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973; "Neo-Colonialism vs. Liberation Struggle. Some Lessons from Portugal's African Colonies", in **Socialist Register 1973**, London, 1974. See also Saul, **Socialist Ideology and the Struggle for Southern Africa**, Africa World Press, Trenton, New Jersey, 1990.

¹⁷ Joseph Hanlon, **Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire**, Zed Books, London, 1984. See also Hanlon, **Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?**, James Currey, London, 1991.

¹⁸ Michel Cahen, **Mozambique: La Revolution Implosee**, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1987; Christian Geffray, **La Cause des Armes au Mozambique: Anthropologie d'une Guerre Civile**, Editions Karthala, 1990.

¹⁹ Gervase Clarence-Smith, *et al*, "The Roots of the Mozambican Counter-Revolution", **Southern African Review of Books**, London, April-May 1989, and subsequent correspondence in the June-July 1989, August-September 1989, December-1989-January 1990, and June-July 1990 issues.

²⁰ Tom Young, "The MNR/RENAMO: external and internal dynamics", **African Affairs**, Volume 89, Number 357, London, 1990.

²¹ Alex Vines, **Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique**, James Currey, London 1990

²² André Thomashausen, "The National Resistance of Mozambique", **Africa Insight**, Volume 13, Number 2, Africa Institute, Pretoria, 1983; and "The Mozambique National Resistance" in C. Maritz (Ed.), **Weerstandbewegings in Suider-Africa**, Potchefstroom University, South Africa, 1987.

²³ Sybil Cline, **Renamo: Anti-Communist Insurgents in Mozambique the Fight Goes On**, United States Global Strategy Council, Washington-DC, 1989.

²⁴ Michel Cahen, **Mozambique: Analyse Politique de Conjoncture**, Indigo, Paris, 1990, p.43.